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LAW IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY: STATES OF
EXCEPTION AND THE TEMPTATIONS OF 9/11
Kim Lane Scheppele∗
INTRODUCTION
When the two large passenger airplanes crashed into the World Trade
Center on that September morning—as two other planes homed in on their
Washington targets—the U.S. government hesitated for three days, and
then declared that America was more or less at war. The President declared a state of emergency,1 while Congress issued a joint declaration authorizing the President to use all “necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001.”2 These pronouncements were later followed by a series of policy
decisions3 and legal changes4 that would enable the United States to con∗

John J. O’Brien Professor of Comparative Law and Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Sparer Symposium at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School on Terrorism and the Constitution: Civil Liberties in a New America on
March 6, 2003, in a panel called “Outside the Law: Alternatives and Challenges to Legal Systems,” of
the Sociology of Law Section of the American Sociological Association, August 2003, Atlanta, Georgia, and at a University of Pennsylvania faculty retreat in October 2003. Participants in all of these sessions were very helpful in the later reformulations of this argument. I would like to thank the students
in my courses on Terrorism and Democracy (spring and fall 2002 and spring 2004) for being willing to
follow through the twists and turns of this story with me as it was evolving. I would also like to thank
helpful audiences at the American Association of Law Schools panel on military tribunals in Washington D.C. in January 2003, and at the Penn Law European Society meeting in Strasbourg, France in June
2003 for their good questions and useful challenges to the general framework presented here. Seth
Kreimer has discussed many of these issues with me, and I have always benefited from his wise counsel. Serguei Oushakine, as always, both reminds me of why anyone should care about these things and
prevents me from thinking about these things only in legal terms. Since things change quickly in this
field, I should mention that this article was finally put to bed in mid-May 2004. What happened after
that time is not reflected here.
1
Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001).
2
S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S9413-01 (2003) (enacted). The resolution also authorized the President to take similar action against all those who “harbored” such persons. Id.
3
By “policy decision,” I mean reinterpreting laws already on the books to do new things. For example, the material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000), was not altered after 9/11, but was used
for newly aggressive purposes—to provide a legal basis to simply hold suspicious people against whom
no criminal charges could yet be filed. The legal cover story was that those detained were material witnesses who were being held to testify before the grand jury that was convened to look into the 9/11 attacks. Before 9/11, the primary use of the material witness statute was to hold key witnesses to testify
in criminal trials, and even then the power was used sparingly. See the different judgments about the
acceptability of the new interpretation before the Second Circuit resolved the conflict by ruling in favor
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duct both a domestic and a foreign operation to combat international terrorism.
Surprising as 9/11 was in its particulars to nearly all of those who
watched it around the world, it was not at all surprising in general from the
standpoint of political theory, which has wrestled for centuries with the
question of what to do with a shock to a political system that is so great that
normal rules seem no longer to apply. Throughout the history of political
thought, the idea of a state of exception has fascinated and repelled political
theorists who have seen in the idea both the only way to defend a state in
peril and the clear road to dictatorship.
In this Article, I explore how the state of exception has been used in
practice in American domestic and foreign policy after 9/11, against a
backdrop of both political theory and comparative responses. In Part I, I
will explore the idea of the state of exception as it has been elaborated in
modern constitutionalism, focusing on the work of Carl Schmitt and the
collapse of the Weimar Constitution and working through the way the
American constitutional order absorbed the idea of the state of emergency
during the Cold War. Schmitt, as we will see, saw the ability of a ruler to
suspend the rule of law as the ultimate act of sovereignty. Something like
this idea was carried on into American policy through the idea of “national
security,” providing both the rationale for the Cold War and the justification for the suspension of what had been normal practice. Though the Cold
War ended decisively more than a decade before 9/11, the United States
never reformulated its guiding ideas about how to manage serious threats.
As a result, confronted with a new enemy after 9/11, the Bush administration fell back into Cold War habits, even though the present threat and the
present world situation are very different.
Against this background of the exception and its rationales, I next explore the specific responses of the United States to 9/11 in both domestic

of the government. Compare United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding
that a person cannot be detained to secure grand jury testimony under the material witness statute),
rev’d, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003), with In re Application of the United States for a Material Witness
Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the material witness statute does permit
witnesses to be detained in conjunction with grand jury proceedings).
4
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (“USA PATRIOT”) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in
scattered titles of U.S.C.), was the major statutory change that followed immediately after 9/11, but, as
the Congressional Research Service analysis itself noted, much of what the USA PATRIOT Act did
was to codify decisions that federal courts had already made; specifically, decisions adverse to criminal
defendants and to those seeking to challenge state authority. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL31200: TERRORISM: SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE USA
PATRIOT
ACT
(2001)
[hereinafter
DOYLE,
TERRORISM],
available
at
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/011210crs.pdf; see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL31377: THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2002) (organizing the analysis thematically), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31377.pdf; CHARLES
DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RS21203: THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A
SKETCH
(2002)
(providing
a
summary
of
his
legal
analysis),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf.
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and foreign policy in Part II of this Article. Since 9/11, the Bush administration has repeatedly invoked its ability to make exceptions to normal legality to cope with the terrorist threat in domestic policy through increasing
invocation of military rationales for its actions. The commander-in-chief
powers that have been invoked by the President have had the effect of undermining both separation of powers and individual rights at home. In foreign policy, the Bush administration acted as though 9/11 created the basis
not only for a national state of emergency, but also an international state of
emergency that requires other countries to make exceptions to both international law and their constitutional orders. The United States, as a result,
has urged its allies to compromise their constitutional and international
commitments to meet the new threat.
As I will show, the Bush administration’s response to 9/11 in both domestic and foreign policy is not what one would typically expect of a true
emergency; namely, quick responses that violate the constitutional order
followed by a progressive normalization. Instead, the American government (including all three branches working together) responded with much
constitutional care right after 9/11, fully aware that the temptation would be
to overreact. The greater abuses have come as 9/11 recedes and executive
policy has turned toward larger and larger constitutional exceptions, with
the active acquiescence so far of both Congress and the courts. The reaction to 9/11 was not the declaration of a sudden emergency that has gradually abated, but instead has involved a measured immediate response followed by ever-expanding justifications for the assertion of executive and
unilateral power.
Following a quick tour of American governmental responses to 9/11, I
return in Part III to the general idea of the state of exception and ask why it
is that America’s democratic allies, also shaken by 9/11, have generally responded so differently. I argue that the Schmittian conception of the state
of exception is no longer considered an acceptable frame of response for
many of our allies, particularly those in Europe. It was precisely the catastrophe of Weimar, the rise of fascism, the experience of communism, and
the history of total wars in the twentieth century that has caused a revision
of the theoretical conception of the state of exception among many of our
European allies and among many new democratic governments elsewhere.
The idea of the state of exception from which the Bush administration has
proceeded has met sharp international criticism, precisely because the international community has moved on from the Schmittian framework to
which the Bush administration’s response bears strong resemblance. Carl
Schmitt’s justification for the state of exception—and by extension the
Bush administration’s justification for the response to the terrorist attacks
of 2001—presupposes a world that no longer exists, even after 9/11. As I
argue, many of America’s allies have seen 9/11 not as a moment when the
rule of law should be suspended, but precisely a moment when the rule of
law needs to be strengthened.

4
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I. THE EXCEPTION
What is (or more precisely, what has been) the state of exception?
Though it has gone by different names over time, the state of exception—or
reason of state, or state of emergency, or état de siège5—has referred to the
situation in which a state is confronted by a mortal threat and responds by
doing things that would never be justifiable in normal times, given the
working principles of that state. The state of exception uses justifications
that only work in extremis, when the state is facing a challenge so severe
that it must violate its own principles to save itself. But of course, the state
of exception is dangerous precisely because it is so subject to abuse. Who
decides whether the situation is one that deserves to be called exceptional?
If some principles of the state are suspended in a crisis, what prevents all of
them from being suspended? And how can the normal situation be restored
when the state of exception is over?
As both Clinton Rossiter6 and Carl Friedrich7 noted in their grand surveys of the historical roots of the idea of the state of exception during the
Cold War, such mortal threats to the political community have been around
since the origin of complex political communities, and so both politicians
and political theorists have always had to confront the justifiable limits of
the normal state of governance. Aristotle’s Politics details how an elected
dictator was charged with restoring domestic order and fighting off aggressive neighbors in ancient Greece.8 The dictatorship in Rome provided a
way to handle severe threats to the institutions of the Republic by elaborating and following established procedures for doing so.9 For Machiavelli’s
Prince, the self-interest that grounded his actions was never regularized in
what a modern reader would think of as constitutional institutions.10 But in
giving advice to the Prince who would surely face periodic crises, Machiavelli issued prudential warnings:
[Now in a well-ordered republic it should never be necessary to resort to extraconstitutional measures; for although they may for the time be beneficial, yet
the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established of disregarding the laws for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under
that pretext for evil purposes. Thus no republic will ever be perfect if she has

5

For the terminological fine-tuning, see JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS: THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING STATES OF EMERGENCY 1 n.1 (1994).
6
CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN
DEMOCRACIES (1948).
7
C.J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE: THE SURVIVAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER (1957).
8
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS: BOOKS III AND IV (Richard Robinson trans., Clarendon Press 1995) (335323 B.C.).
9
As Rossiter notes, when a situation of emergency was imminent, consent of both the senate and
the consuls was necessary for a dictator to be appointed to fend off the crisis. Dictators were never
permitted to appoint other dictators. ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 19–20. The terms of the dictators were
strictly limited to six months. Id. at 23.
10
FRIEDRICH, supra note 7, at 32.
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not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency, and
11
fixed rules for applying it.

Later, Jean Bodin thought that the Prince should be accountable only to
God and not to his fellow mortals for what was done as a matter of necessity,12 which effectively reduced the normative influence of anything like
representative government or its institutions.
In short, while political theorists wrestled for centuries with the question of whether emergency government was justifiable, it might be easy for
those of us living in constitutional democracies to dismiss their analyses
because the political and historical contexts about which they wrote were
so different from those of the present day. In particular, the rise of secular,
democratic, and constitutional government seems to have created a different dilemma of justification, precisely because executives in constitutional
democracies are supposed to be accountable to and removable by electorates, and also because modern constitutions embrace both separation of
powers and justiciable systems of rights. For an executive to seize power
and suspend rights under a democratic constitutional government is an entirely different matter, normatively speaking, than for a monarch (even a
constitutional monarch) to do so. In a modern constitutional democracy,
the suspension of separation of powers and of substantial bodies of rights to
cope with an emergency requires justification in terms of both the viability
of accountable government and the long-term respect for rights in the constitutional order. Thus, while monarchies generally possess some residual
elements of unaccountability and of extraordinary executive powers, republican government attempts to purge both. States of emergency, then, pose
more difficult problems of justification in republics than in monarchies.
Written constitutions before the twentieth century did not typically attempt to regulate a state of exception in detail. The U.S. Constitution forbids suspension of the “[p]rivilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus . . . unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”13
This is an indirect admission that there may be times when the normal rules
do not apply and in such times, the courts may be prohibited from reviewing the legality of detentions. But the location of this power of suspension
as a power of the Congress, given to it along with the power “[t]o declare
War,”14 indicates that emergency government was never meant to be reserved for executive action alone. That Congress’s role in a state of emergency was meant to be primary may be further supported by the Third
Amendment, which says that quartering of troops in private homes in a
time of war shall only be done if there is a law allowing it.15 Given that
11

THE DISCOURSES OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI bk. I, discourse 34, at 203 (Luigi Ricci and E.R.P.
Vincent trans., Modern Library, 1950) (1513).
12
For an elaboration, see FRIEDRICH, supra note 7, at 72–73.
13
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
14
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
15
Id. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent
of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”).
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laws must be passed by Congress, the Third Amendment in effect says that
no unilateral commander-in-chief power may intrude upon the inviolability
of the home. In time of war, rebellion, and other emergencies, then, Congress was given a strong role, almost certainly the lead role, in the process
of emergency governance envisioned in the U.S. Constitution. While
emergencies may result in a temporary suspension of judicial power
through limitation of the writ of habeas corpus, the emergency provisions
of the U.S. Constitution do not allow suspension of congressional power.
Instead, they seem to require that the president’s own power be subordinate
to that of the Congress at such a time.
European constitutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries tentatively began to elaborate the idea of a constitutional state of emergency, but
typically left all important details to statutes. One could argue that the
French Constitutions of 1795 and 1800 were constitutions written only for
a time of emergency. The Constitution of the Directorate in 1795 established a committee of rulers with nearly unlimited powers, and the Napoleonic Constitution of 1800 consolidated Napoleon’s power grab by proclaiming him, by proper name, to be the primary head of state.16 Neither of
these were constitutions in the modern and liberal sense, ensuring separation of powers and respect for rights. The French Constitution of 1848,
however, included as Article 106 a general provision that said that a law
should determine when a state of siege could be declared, but left details to
that law.17 General framework statutes passed in France in 1849 and again
in 1878 specified how a state of siege could be determined, what new and
exceptional powers could be taken by the government in such a time, and
how the state of siege would be ended.18 In much of the nineteenth century
in Europe, however, even when constitutions did try to establish separation
of powers and respect for the rights of citizens, they typically broke down
under stress, and had to be rewritten when the crises were over. The invocation of emergency provisions typically spelled the end of the constitutional order itself. The periods between breakdown and reconstruction
were simply non-constitutional moments.
Against this background, the Weimar Constitution, written in Germany
in the shadow of the First World War, tried harder than most constitutions
to ensure that constitutional failure in a time of emergency did not occur.
To that end, the constitutional drafters inserted into the text Article 48, a
provision that defined rather precisely a constitutional state of emergency.19
16

R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
186–93 (1995).
17
LA CONSTITUTION DE LA SECONDE REPUBLIQUE of 1848 [Constitution], art. 106 (Fr.).
18
ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 81.
19
Article 48 states:
If any state fails to perform the duties imposed upon it by the federal constitution or by
federal laws, the president may hold it to the performance thereof with the aid of the armed
forces.
If the public safety and order in the German Reich is materially disturbed or endangered,
the president may take the necessary measures to restore public safety and order, intervening if
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Article 48 gave the president extraordinary powers to cope with extraordinary threats to the system, up to and including both the suspension of a particular and limited set of rights as well as the use of armed forces to quell
domestic disturbances. The inclusion of Article 48 in the Weimar Constitution did not signal a flight of constitutional abstraction; the need to have a
constitutional state of emergency provision was obvious to all who worked
on the text. With Germany in chaos after its defeat in the First World
War,20 and with the German political scene marked by the blossoming of
radical political parties advocating extreme remedies for extreme times,21
some method for the defense of the new constitutional government had to
be inserted into the new constitution. Article 48 was adopted by a “decisive majority”22 of the constitutional assembly.
In the thirteen years that the Weimar Constitution limped along before
being simply suspended, Article 48 was invoked more than 250 times,23
130 times in the first few years of the constitutional order alone.24 As Rossiter has noted, “[l]acking the emergency competence provided in Article
48, the rulers of republican Germany could hardly have launched their infant democracy into the stormy seas of postwar Europe.”25 At the start, Article 48 seemed to work as planned; it repeatedly saved the new democratic
order from being undermined by domestic extremists.
Many of the deepest constitutional issues surrounding the use of the
state of emergency were never solved legally or politically, however, and
the uncertainties surrounding the legitimate use of Article 48 only magnified with time. For one thing, no German parliament in Weimar ever
passed the general framework law that Article 48 required to regulate the
uses of a state of emergency in more detail. As a result, the specific types
of crises that could trigger Article 48 were never specified, and Article 48
was used for ever-widening types of state maladies, from civil violence at
necessary with the aid of the armed forces. To this end he may temporarily suspend, in whole
or in part, the fundamental rights established by Articles 114 [personal liberty], 115 [inviolability of dwelling places], 117 [secrecy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications], 118
[freedom in the expression of opinion], 123 [freedom of assembly], 124 [freedom of association] and 153 [private property].
The president must immediately inform the Reichstag of all measures adopted by authority
of the first or second paragraphs of this Article. These measures are to be revoked upon demand
of the Reichstag.
In cases where delay would be dangerous[,] the cabinet of a state government may for its
own territory take provisional measures as specified in paragraph 2. These measures are to be
revoked on demand of the president or of the Reichstag.
Further details will be regulated by federal law.
WEIMAR CONST. of 1919, art. 48 (F.R.G.), translated in FREDERICK MUNDELL WATKINS, THE FAILURE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS UNDER THE GERMAN REPUBLIC 15 (1939).
20
For a dire description, see WATKINS, supra note 19, at 6–7.
21
Id. at 25–35.
22
ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 35. For more on the history of Article 48, see id. at 33–37; WATKINS,
supra note 19, at 13–14.
23
ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 33.
24
Id. at 38.
25
Id.
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the start, to economic crises by the middle, to merely sharp political disagreement by the end. Furthermore, while at the beginning of the Republic, in the early 1920s, emergency decrees were often backed up by legislation that normalized these decrees quickly thereafter, this legislative
validation soon went missing into the 1930s as the popular support for parties that opposed the constitutional order translated into more and more extremist representatives in the parliament, who failed wherever possible to
do what was required to maintain the constitutional system. By the time
the parliament was finally dissolved,26 making the executive decrees authorized under Article 48 the only effective source of law, the institutions
of the Weimar Constitution that might have prevented such a consolidation
of power (federalism, independent courts, parliament) had all been neutralized by the prior creeping use of an ever-expanding Article 48.27
The well-known story of the collapse of the Weimar Constitution is recounted here because it is both a cautionary tale for modern constitutionalists and also because the prolonged period of crisis that Weimar experienced produced theoretical justifications for the state of emergency that are
in many ways more resonant to the modern ear. As a result, the place to
start in thinking about theoretical justifications for states of emergency in a
system of democratically accountable, representative, and rights-respecting
government is with Carl Schmitt, who not only attempted to justify the
state of exception in a constitutional democracy but who, in the end, played
a role in the demise of the Weimar Constitution itself.
Carl Schmitt famously begins his work Political Theology with the sentence: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”28 By equating the
sovereign with the capacity to define when a situation can be handled
within normal rules and when it must be treated as an exception to normal
governance, Schmitt takes as a defining feature of a political sovereign the
ability to operate outside juridical “normality.” In fact, it is precisely the

26

Article 25 of the Weimar Constitution allowed the president to dissolve the parliament once for
any reason. WATKINS, supra note 19, at 22–23. But Article 48’s check on emergency powers indicated
that the parliament could, by a majority vote, require the state of emergency to be lifted. Id. at 15. Obviously, if the parliament were constitutionally dissolved under Article 25, it would not be around to
exercise the separation-of-powers check built into Article 48.
27
In light of the argument to follow, it is interesting to note that one of the first commentators on
the Weimar Constitution to notice the possibility that Article 48 could be used in this unchecked way
was Carl Schmitt, who wrote in 1922:
According to article 48 of the German constitution of 1919, the exception is declared by the
president of the Reich but is under the control of parliament, the Reichstag, which can at any
time demand its suspension. This provision corresponds to the development and practice of the
liberal constitutional state, which attempts to repress the question of sovereignty by a division
and mutual control of competences. . . . If applied without check, it would grant exceptional
powers in the same way as article 14 of the [French] Charter of 1815, which made the monarch
sovereign.
CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 11
(George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922).
28
Id. at 5.
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unanticipated nature of the emergency that calls for such powers. According to Schmitt:
The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out
what may take place in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of an
extreme emergency and of how it is to be eliminated. The precondition as well
as the content of jurisdictional competence in such a case must necessarily be
unlimited. From the liberal constitutional point of view, there would be no jurisdictional competence at all. The most guidance the constitution can provide
29
is to indicate who can act in such a case.

For Schmitt, liberal constitutions fool their citizens if it appears that
these constitutions could have accounted for everything. There will always
be moments outside the constitutional range of legitimate expectation, and
legitimate constitutional action under unanticipated and extreme threats can
never be fully elucidated within a constitution’s terms. This is a clear challenge to the idea that the rule of law must constrain rulers and ruled alike,
for if the rule of law constrains the sovereign entirely, then the sovereign
should not be able to claim exception to the rules. But an emergency
makes visible the incompleteness of the constitutional design because by its
very nature, it cannot be predicted in its particulars in advance. In practice,
Schmitt seems to say, a liberal constitution can therefore never be complete. The ability of the sovereign to act outside the rules in the case of
emergency, however, is precisely the signature element that constitutes
sovereignty and it is something with which liberal constitutions cannot dispense unless they are to be destroyed by the exceptional challenge.
If the sovereign can claim exception, then the sovereign must have all
of the lesser-included powers—for example, the power to decide when the
situation has ceased to be “normal,” thereby justifying the declaration of
emergency, the power to determine when the emergency is over so that the
rule of law may be safely restored, and the power to specify which political
actors normally protected by the rule of law lose their protection in the interim. Rather than seeing the rule of law as something that must be followed for its own sake as a way of ensuring the integrity of the state,
Schmitt argues that the rule of law may prevent a polity from defending itself in the event of a serious political crisis, and that the capacity of a ruler
to maintain the very existence of the state may depend on that ruler not being bound by the rules.30 In fact, it is the most distinctive power of a sovereign—not simply an incidental and unusual capacity—that he has the
power to suspend the law.
Schmitt justified his view that a sovereign must possess the ability to
determine the state of exception in a sociological31 manner:
29

Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 12 (“The state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right of selfpreservation, as one would say.”).
31
Schmitt, however, said explicitly that the exception is a juristic and not a sociological category:
“It would be a distortion of the schematic disjunction between sociology and jurisprudence if one were
to say that the exception has no juristic significance and is therefore ‘sociology.’” Id. at 13. By this, he
30
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Every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can
be factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations. The norm requires a homogeneous medium. This effective normal situation is not a mere
“superficial presupposition” that a jurist can ignore; that situation belongs precisely to [the norm’s] immanent validity. There exists no norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist,
and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists.
32

All law is “situational law.”

According to this analysis, the juridical order itself requires for its
maintenance a regular field of life, a habitus or a certain taken-for-granted
predictability, in order for the small deviations that the juridical order controls to be noticeable. If half the population becomes murderers, then the
law against murder is no longer a purely juridical matter. Instead, when the
field of life becomes so disordered that the jurist can no longer distinguish
between the normal and the abnormal, then the sovereign must act—in
Schmitt’s view—to restore the condition of normality necessary for any
rule-of-law system to make sense. The state of exception is, as a result, the
means for restoring the order necessary for legality to exist. The political
moment that justifies invoking the state of exception is the moment when
the possibility of restoring a field of order requires that the rules themselves
do not apply to the means of restoration.
Moreover, according to Schmitt, it is the exception that gives meaning
to the rule in the first place, since one cannot understand a rule except by
noting the edges of its applicability.33 The rule gains meaning from publicizing what is not covered in its ambit.34 It is therefore the exception that
defines the extent and core meaning of the rule. Through exceptions—and
nonexceptions—the juridical order comes to have its distinctive shape and
character.
A more comprehensive “state of exception” of the sort that arises in political crises implicates not just an individual rule, but the limits of the juridical field itself. Invoking a state of exception to the juridical field as a
whole indicates, as in the case of the individual exception, the defining limits of the taken-for-granted condition. The possibility of a state of exception existing outside the juridical field but still within the political field creates the condition for the separation of law and politics. It opens up the
practical reality that the rule of law may cover only part of what politics
seems to mean that the exception is a category within jurisprudence even if recognition of its distinctive
markers requires sociological judgment to recognize.
32
Id.
33
In many ways, this parallels the Durkheimian tradition of argument about the role of deviance in
maintaining the boundaries of a social community. See KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS (1966)
(arguing that the punishment of deviant conduct publicizes the boundaries of a community and therefore enables the community to better understand its moral architecture).
34
This point is particularly well-elaborated in the analysis of Schmitt in GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO
SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 15–29 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press
1998) (1995).
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may do. Consequently, some of what counts as politics must exist outside
the field of law. If, in Schmitt’s formulation, the distinctive capacity of the
sovereign is to define the exception, then the sovereign can never be fully
bound by law. The broader significance of the state of exception, then, is
to define the basic qualities of the sovereign’s responsibility, only some of
which are legally defined.
Schmitt’s analysis echoes some of the logical puzzles of nineteenth and
early twentieth century legal positivism—which is not surprising since legal positivists were among his main interlocutors in the theoretical debates
he entered in the 1920s and 1930s in his native Germany.35 For legal positivists, all law is the command of the sovereign; it exists as a factual matter
distinguishable from its normative advisability. But if law is in fact just
that which the sovereign commands, then what can (normatively) bind the
sovereign? Schmitt’s answer is broadly consistent with that of the legal
positivists of his day: in the end, the sovereign can only be bound by voluntary acceptance of his own commands.36 That meant, for Schmitt, that
the sovereign could also exempt himself from his own commands when the
circumstances dictated.37 What separated Schmitt from his positivist colleagues was his concern with the practical realities of governance over the
abstract properties of concepts. In the context of Weimar Germany, where
the constitutional order lurched from one unstable government to the next
and where the economy lurched along with it, determining the legitimate
response to immediate crisis was more than a purely theoretical issue.
Schmitt’s view—offered against defenders of parliamentarianism—was
that liberal parliamentary systems would simply collapse without the decisive judgments of a single sovereign who was vested with the power to
suspend the rules in order to save them.38 In fact, before his eyes in Weimar, liberal parliamentary government seemed always on the brink of failure.
Moreover, Schmitt added that it may be the sovereign’s obligation to
violate the normal rules of governance because the integrity and viability of
the state itself was the sovereign’s responsibility.39 If the state were under
mortal threat, Schmitt believed, then the sovereign had to act.40 Preservation of the possibility of an ordered life, so crucial in his analysis of the ordinary juridical field, had to take priority over the normal operation of that
ordinary juridical field in times that were not ordinary. Exceptional means,
then, were warranted in exceptional times. And it was the job of the sovereign to decide which times were exceptional.
35

For more on these debates, see ELLEN KENNEDY, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE: SCHMITT IN
WEIMAR (forthcoming 2004) and PETER C. CALDWELL, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CRISIS OF
GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF WEIMAR CONSTITUTIONALISM (1997).
36
SCHMITT, supra note 27, at 12.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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As it happened, the Weimar Constitution concretely lacked any guidance for determining when a situation had gotten to the point of being constitutionally ungovernable, and its only effective check on the power of the
president to declare a state of emergency turned out to be relatively easy to
undermine. As a consequence, whenever the president believed that an
emergency was imminent, the president could suspend many ordinary constitutional rules of operation.41 While Article 48 required that the presidentially declared state of emergency had to end when the lower chamber of
the parliament so demanded, this provision interacted badly with Article 25
of the Constitution, which allowed the president to dissolve the parliament.
Once the president declared a state of emergency under Article 48 and dissolved the parliament for the same reasons under Article 25, Article 48’s
“checks and balances provision” (that the lower house of the parliament
could force the president to end the state of emergency) was no longer effective. Through these absolutely constitutional mechanisms, the unconstitutional state of Nazi Germany was born.
The world viewed (and experienced) with horror what happened next.
Nazi Germany, with Schmitt providing justificatory support for the use of
emergency powers, attacked its neighbors, conquered much of Europe
(with massive devastation of people and property), launched its purge of
European Jews and Roma, created the camps, and committed genocide.
The concrete events are rather a lot to attribute to Schmitt, but his justification of emergency government assisted in rationalizing the early phases of
the Nazi seizure of power precisely because he sketched a compelling portrait of the need and justification for the state of exception. As Europe
struggled to recover from the dislocation and destruction of the Second
World War, it was not surprising that many of those who had suffered from
the consequences of the war had second thoughts about emergency powers
and their legitimate use. I will return to the European story in Part III of
this Article, but suffice it to say for now that much of the effort to avoid repeating these mistakes involved placing constitutional faith in strengthened
courts, which were the least tainted political institution to emerge from under the rubble of conquered and conquering states. The solution to the
state-of-emergency problem, as it was elaborated after the war in much of
Europe, was to specify the legal stages of the exception in such a way that
an unconstitutional state could never emerge through emergency provisions. For example, when the post-war German Basic Law was amended
in 1968 to include the emergency powers that had been deliberately omitted
when the constitution was first written, the amendment clearly specified
that the Constitutional Court had to remain open and able to hear chal-

41

See supra note 19 for a listing of the concrete constitutional provisions whose suspension Article
48 authorized. These included inviolability of both the person and private homes; secrecy of mail and
postal communications; freedom of speech, assembly and association; and the right to private property.
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lenges throughout any state of emergency and that the executive could not
make a declaration of emergency alone.42
The lessons Americans learned from the horrors of World War II were
quite different from those taken away from the war by the Europeans. The
difference can be seen in how American occupying forces in Germany intervened in the constitutional drafting process in 1948. Americans took the
most substantial interest in ensuring a strengthened and unamendable federalism,43 rather than in insisting upon a different way of thinking about
emergency powers. The ability to subvert federalism was, in the American
view, the primary structural weakness of the Weimar Constitution, not the
use of emergency powers to radically increase executive powers.
From the position of their own newly dominant role in the world after
the war, American leaders diagnosed that they had failed in the 1930s to
see the signs of an oncoming menace early enough. In the immediate postwar period in the United States, foreign policy was guided by the firm conviction that one should not give any benefit of the doubt to a potential enemy, lest one be guilty of appeasement:
The word appeaser, easily thrown about, became the most pungent of foreign
policy expletives, the quickest way to silence a dissenter, forestall diplomacy.
And, of course, appeasement connoted weakness, and so suggested blindness
and stupidity or, worse, something approaching treason. Again and again, the
lesson of Munich was explicitly summoned for interpreting events and shaping
policies in the postwar years.
So it was that “Hitler’s salami tactics” over the years became the “domino
44
theory.”

Rather than being preoccupied with how to prevent a “regime of horror,”45 which was the German constitutional challenge after the war,
Americans were more concerned with empowering government to meet
new threats. Rather than finding new ways to strengthen the resilience of
the constitutional order and to place limits on executive power, which were
the pressing German constitutional issues, Americans were more concerned
with expanding executive power to cope with dangers that faced the United
States because of its newly dominant role as the only advanced industrial
country left relatively unscathed after the war. In this new world, as
American policymakers quickly saw, the threats were quick to materialize
and, sooner rather than later, the Cold War was the result.

42

GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts.
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: GERMANY 67,

80a, 115g (F.R.G.), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF
87 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2003).
43
For evidence of the American role in the drafting of the German Basic Law, see generally PETER
MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC (1963).
44
DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STATE 198 (1977).
45
Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Interpretation After Regimes of Horror, in STUDIES IN LAW,
POLITICS AND SOCIETY (Patricia Ewick & Austin Sarat eds., forthcoming 2005).

14

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 6:5

The origins of the Cold War have been disputed often enough;46 for the
purposes of this Article, one need only observe that the onset of the Cold
War had substantial constitutional consequences for the United States. The
Cold War was not the first time that the United States had endured something like a crisis government. But the previous crises—the Civil War,
World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II—had been imagined
to be of limited duration. While they were accompanied by a serious catalogue of constitutional violations, such violations were eventually condemned as being excesses of a particular time, not affecting America’s
normal constitutional operation or its constitutional aspirations.47 The Cold
War was different: it promised an indefinite future of crises and a perpetual alteration of both separation of powers and individual rights. In short,
the Cold War ushered in an era of “permanent emergency” in which the
constitutional sacrifices that were to be made were not clearly temporary or
reversible.
The constitutional effects of the Cold War have been well-documented.
One was the rise of what Harold Koh has called the “national security constitution,” which concentrated foreign affairs power almost exclusively in
the presidency.48 In the mid-1930s the Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. had, at least in dicta, indicated that
the power to conduct foreign affairs lay exclusively with the president.49
But the institutional entrenchment of that extreme understanding of presidential powers in foreign policy came in the post-World War II period with
the National Security Act of 1947.50 The National Security Act emerged
originally as a proposal from the armed services to ward off a serious effort

46

The dispute roughly centers on who was more at fault for the start of the Cold War—the Soviet
Union or the United States. Immediate post-war American political analysts emphasized the expansionist and aggressive aims of the Soviet Union as a reason for launching the United States’ new state of
permanent war. Later, American historians, writing in the age of Vietnam, tended to view the historical
evidence differently, emphasizing that many domestic considerations led the United States to interpret
signals from the Soviet Union in the most negative possible light when they might have been understood as less threatening to American interests. For more on the historiographic debate over the origins
of the Cold War, see PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 447–57 (1988).
47
Some of the major exceptions—Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus upon delegation of this
power by Congress, the Palmer Raids, the various attempts by President Roosevelt to circumvent judicial disapproval of the economic emergency measures during the Depression, the initiation of martial
law in Hawaii during the Second World War, and the detention of Japanese-Americans during that
war—are generally portrayed as being unusual and temporary moments in American history, at least in
constitutional retrospect. But not all have been legally repudiated. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Defending
Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273 (examining the claim
that the U.S. government has often viewed its abrogation of individual rights during security crises as
unnecessary in retrospect).
48
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67–69 (1990).
49
299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936).
50
Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. ch. 15
(2000)).
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to merge the services at the end of the war.51 Instead, what resulted from a
combination of bureaucratic wrangling (the services fought back against
the merger) and the perception of an external threat (the Soviet Union
tightened its hold over Eastern Europe) was a new unification of the command structure of the military in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the creation
of a new body, the National Security Council, that would give foreign policy advice directly to the president. Perhaps most importantly, a Central
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) was formed that was not under the command
of the individual forces, as had been the case before, but that was instead
directly accountable to the president. The National Security Act reorganized the foreign policy apparatus of the United States and placed it more
firmly in the hands of the president, out of the reach of Congress. Though
Congress had passed this law, Congress seemed to envision no role for itself in the ongoing operation of the new national security bureaucracy.
The National Security Act was accompanied by a new view of the
world, one that had the term “national security” at its heart. The expression
“national security” had not been in common use before World War II.52
But its preeminence during and after the war signaled a new understanding
of what the foreign policy of the United States was designed to protect. In
particular, it allowed a wide range of actions far afield in the world to count
as direct threats to the United States. As Daniel Yergin put it:
[W]hat characterizes the concept of national security? It postulates the interrelatedness of so many different political, economic, and military factors that developments halfway around the globe are seen to have automatic and direct impact on America’s core interests. Virtually every development in the world is
perceived to be potentially crucial. An adverse turn of events anywhere endangers the United States. Problems in foreign relations are viewed as urgent and
immediate threats. Thus, desirable foreign policy goals are translated into issues of national survival, and the range of threats becomes limitless. The doctrine is characterized by expansiveness, a tendency to push the subjective
boundaries of security outward to more and more areas, to encompass more and
more geography and more and more problems. It demands that the country assume a posture of military preparedness; the nation must be on permanent
alert. . . . All of this leads to a paradox: the growth of American power did not
lead to a greater sense of assuredness, but rather to an enlargement of the range
53
of perceived threats that must urgently be confronted.

The idea of national security, permanently emblazoned on the signature
legislation of the Cold War, required that the United States maintain a permanent army in a state of perpetual readiness because small events anywhere in the world could be signs of a mortal danger to the nation. “National security” was eventually filled with the realization that the primary
enemy of the United States had weapons that could destroy the entire country—and ultimately, the whole world—on short notice. Little wonder that
51
52
53

YERGIN, supra note 44, at 336–38.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 196.
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the Supreme Court’s apparent grant of executive power in Curtiss-Wright
was taken up with special urgency as the Cold War settled in. A president
could not possibly debate policy with Congress while there was an incoming Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Nuclear missiles left no time for democratic debate.
The edginess that produced the Cold War also produced a very large
number of emergencies. The newly established National Security Council
got to work and produced Paper 68 in April 1950, an analysis that provided
“the first comprehensive statement of a national strategy after World War
II.”54 It predicted “an indefinite period of tension and danger.”55 The perpetual legal state of emergency began shortly thereafter. President Truman
first declared a state of emergency in response to the deteriorating situation
in Korea in December 1950,56 a state of emergency that lasted nearly a
quarter of a century.57 Under the policy of “containment,” the United
States saw every attempt—or possible attempt—by the Soviet Union to expand its influence as a direct threat to the United States. As a result, the
emergency declaration of 1950 was used to justify a number of other foreign actions in the fight against communism.
Domestically, as part of the same effort, Truman announced the power
to classify government information bearing on national security.58 This latter move made it very difficult for anyone, including Congress, to check on
what was being done in the name of national security. Under the cloak of
national security secrecy, the U.S. government engaged for decades in
abuses of rights to gather information relevant in the struggle against the
Soviet Union and to do whatever was necessary to prepare for imminent
war. As the “Church Committee”—named for its chair, Senator Frank
Church—found in the mid-1970s in its investigations into domestic surveillance since World War II:
—Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were opened and photographed
in the United States by the CIA between 1953–1973, producing a CIA computerized index of nearly one and one-half million names.
—At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and photographed by the FBI
between 1940–1966 in eight U.S. cities.
—Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA computer system and separate files were created on approximately 7,200 Americans and over 100 domestic groups during the course of [the] CIA’s Operation CHAOS (1967–1973).
—Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or through the United States were
obtained by the National Security Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a secret arrangement with three United States telegraph companies.

54

Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1401 (1989)
(quoting Senator Henry Jackson’s characterization of National Security Council Paper 68).
55
Id.
56
Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (Dec. 19, 1950).
57
Lobel, supra note 54, at 1401.
58
Exec. Order No. 10,290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9795 (Sept. 24, 1951).
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—An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of United States Army
intelligence files created between the mid-1960s and 1971.
—Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals and groups were created
by the Internal Revenue Service between 1969 and 1973 and tax investigations
were started on the basis of political rather than tax criteria.
—At least 26,000 individuals were at one point catalogued on an FBI list of
59
persons to be rounded up in the event of a “national emergency.”

In addition, the U.S. government irradiated, without their consent, more
than 250,000 American citizens (most, but not all, in the military) in experiments to test the effects of nuclear weapons.60 In 1952, Congress appropriated $775,000 to establish six detention camps under the emergency
detention provision of the Internal Security Act of 1950, though the camps
were not used in the end.61 McCarthyism was the extreme edge of the active attacks on suspected communists,62 but the domestic fight against
communists led to a systematic reinterpretation of the rights of both citizens and aliens.63 The persecution of suspected communists through blacklisting, criminal prosecution, and even execution64 was accompanied by an
alarming expansion of the surveillance powers of the U.S. government,
surveillance that also included actions taken to disrupt groups and the per-

59

S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. 2, at pp. 6-7 (1976) (citations omitted), microformed on CIS No. 76S963-2 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
60
Jill Elaine Hasday, Civil War as Paradigm: Reestablishing the Rule of Law at the End of the
Cold War, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Winter 1996, at 129, 138.
61
The details can be found in ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN
AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO 1976, at 322–66 (2001).
62
For the history of the McCarthy period in original documents, see generally MCCARTHYISM: THE
GREAT AMERICAN RED SCARE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Albert Fried ed. 1997).
63
I have elaborated elsewhere how this strong influence of the Soviet Union in American constitutional law generated, upon closer inspection, a mixed legacy. Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and
Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influences Through Negative
Models, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296 (2003). The restrictions on civil liberties evident during the domestic
search for communists occurred at the same time as the expansion of civil liberties for African Americans, and the two were connected. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE
IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000). The Truman and Eisenhower administrations, seeing the
importance of the outcome of the Cold War in winning the hearts and minds of the about-to-beliberated colonies in Africa, repeatedly urged in briefs to the Supreme Court that African Americans be
assisted in their struggle for equality. The Soviet Union had used the lack of equal rights of blacks in
the United States as an effective propaganda tool in its Cold War effort to win over the newly establishing states. Successive American administrations saw an important foreign policy interest in providing
equal rights for African Americans in order to counter the Soviet threat. Id.
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The case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg has recently been revisited with the opening of the Soviet
archive, which seems to show that Julius was in fact a spy but not responsible for the disclosure of
atomic secrets, the specific allegation that resulted in his conviction and execution. There is no evidence to suggest that Ethel was ever a spy. Her brother, David Greenglass, who has been the key witness against her in the trial, admitted several years ago in an interview on 60 Minutes II that he lied in
his testimony in order to protect himself and his wife. 60 Minutes II: The Traitor (CBS television
broadcast, Dec. 5, 2001). Some suggest that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover knew of Ethel’s innocence,
but insisted that charges be pressed as a way of leveraging information from Julius, who could have
secured her release by cooperating with the government.
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sonal lives of their members well into the 1970s.65 Between the 1950s and
the 1970s, Congress passed about 470 statutes that empowered the executive branch to act under emergency powers. These statutes delegated
“power to the executive over virtually every facet of American life.”66
Following the intense political battles over Vietnam and Watergate in
the 1970s, when the presidency itself came into disrepute, Congress reclaimed some of its powers in the perpetual state of emergency. In one
statute, Congress terminated all existing states of emergency and provided
more stringent rules for how such emergencies should be declared in the
future.67 But in another statute, Congress extended the reach of states of
emergency to international economic affairs.68 The War Powers Resolution
represented another attempt by Congress in this period to restore a role for
the legislative branch in committing American troops abroad,69 and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) was designed to provide
some judicial check on the ability of the executive to engage in domestic
spying on those who were thought to be part of foreign-originated plots
without having to meet the high hurdles of the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement.70
As most observers have noted, however, all of these attempts by Congress to reclaim some of its lost foreign policy powers were, and continue
to be, quite ineffectual.71 Not only has the president asked permission of
the Congress before committing the country to military engagements or
foreign policy obligations only as a matter of courtesy rather than as a matter of law (and then only sometimes), but Congress has typically not attempted to enforce any of its powers under the 1970s-era legislation.72 The
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Cold War state of affairs, in which the executive operated under nearly
constant emergency powers with a quiescent Congress refusing to intervene, continued. While one might have thought that the midcourse correction of the 1970s would have ended the period of executive government,
the Iran-Contra affair in the 1980s suggested otherwise.73
Does the experience of Weimar have anything to contribute to thinking
about the U.S. government’s uses of emergency powers in the Cold War?
Of course, the uses of emergency powers in Weimar Germany were very
different from those in post-World War II United States. While in Weimar,
the dissolution of the parliament marked an end to separation of powers
and a suspension of the constitutional framework altogether, the American
government maintained its constitutional institutions through the Cold War.
American presidents generally acted with congressional delegations of
power, however broad and vague they might have been. Courts reviewed
and sometimes corrected the worst offenses;74 Congress occasionally attempted to curb the executive as well.75 The overall shape of the American
government, however, took on some of the same distinctive features of crisis government that could be discerned in Weimar as many powers were
swept into the vortex of a constantly expanding executive branch.
In both Weimar Germany and the United States, executives gained
great powers through declarations of states of emergency, powers that were
used to justify both the use of force abroad and restrictions on rights at
home. While the emergencies in Weimar started as domestic ones, they did
not remain domestic in their application and they had even more devastating consequences when their effects spread beyond the border. Conversely, while American emergencies might have been triggered by events
abroad during the Cold War, eventually they came home as the U.S. government began to realize that foreign and foreign-influenced enemies could
not be kept outside national borders. In short, in neither case was the state
of emergency confined to the area which had originally triggered its application. In both Weimar and in the Cold War, states of emergency generally
spread from the reasonably perceived threat to a wider and wider sphere of
potential dangers with a smaller and smaller evidentiary base for each expansion of the threat. Each new threat, however slight, justified changing
provision that Congress had inserted into the 1970s reform legislation as a device for controlling the
president.
73
KOH, supra note 48, at 101–16.
74
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what had been the normal rules of procedure to cope with the new form of
danger.
Schmitt had emphasized, for Weimar, the need for the executive to act
unilaterally because parliamentary democracy could not sustain the decisiveness necessary to cope with a mortal threat to the state. In fact, according to Schmitt, the nature of the regime could itself be defined in terms of
the ability of the sovereign to put the rule of law aside in order to cope with
a serious danger. Successful democratic governments required an illiberal
core that could be exposed when the state was endangered. The sovereign,
in Schmitt’s view, had ultimate responsibility for the continuing existence
of the state, and this was ultimately what gave the sovereign permission to
set aside constitutional rules to act directly to cope with the threat. As with
Schmitt’s sovereign, American presidents could, acting in their official capacities, slip out from under constitutional constraint at nearly every turn.76
While Schmitt imagined that this would occur because the law would simply fail to cover these actions and the sovereign would then have to step
outside the law, the American constitutional experience was slightly different. The U.S. Constitution has capaciously expanded to adjust to all expansions of executive power without appearing to fail. The Constitution’s
meaning has changed as it has been aggressively interpreted by Cold War
executives and as both Congress and the courts ratified this new meaning
through acquiescence. The Weimar Constitution may have broken under
emergency government, but the American Constitution bent.
After the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union surprisingly released its satellites and then disbanded itself, one might have expected the
American government to go back to the way it had been before the Cold
War began. At the very least, one might have expected the United States to
rethink the extraordinarily lopsided executive government that had developed to respond to the Soviet threat. But such was not the case. Though
there were calls to “reestablish[] the rule of law at the end of the Cold
War,”77 Cold War habits had ossified into permanent traits of constitutional
character. The American presidency is as strong, if not stronger, than ever.
The practical deference of courts to the political branches is nearly universal on all matters of foreign and military policy, including outsized claims
of national security. Congress has largely ceded its powers in the realm of
foreign policy, providing only lax and fitful oversight. The balance of
powers struck during the Cold War, with a bulked-up executive, a wizened
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Congress, their disputes only partly subject to refereeing by courts, remains
largely intact.
II. AMERICA AFTER 9/11
A. The State of Exception in Domestic Policy
“Everything has changed,” political commentators muttered darkly,
without specifying what “everything” was or in what direction it had
“changed.” “The world after 9/11” has become a specific historical moment, referred to as if it has a logic of its own.78 Those who can clearly recall the United States before 9/11 may compare it with the present moment
and be shocked by the new mentalité: the self-confident and blithely liberal United States has become haunted by fear, more inward-looking, and
less open to debate. As I will argue, after 9/11, the Bush administration has
declared an ever-expanding state of exception in which more and more of
the taken-for-granted operating rules of American law have been suspended
in the name of the war against terrorism. This new state of exception bears
many of the features of Cold War exceptionalism at its height.
Terrorism was obviously not new with 9/11, nor were attacks by al
Qaeda against Americans new on that day. What changed was the framework through which they were seen. As pre-9/11 books on terrorism customarily noted, nations have a choice between thinking of terrorist attacks
as large crimes (on the model of organized crime or other criminal conspiracies) or as small wars (on the model of insurgent attacks).79 Under the
Clinton administration, terrorist attacks were seen primarily as big crimes
with a small war component.80 They were handled as a first matter by the
78

Historians are already considering what this moment means in the light of their profession:

[H]ow transformative was September 11? Would it become an iconic historical event, marking
a transition in the history of the United States and of the world? Or was it instead best understood as an aspect of pre-existing historical trajectories? Did it change law, politics, religion,
and culture, or did it instead simply provide a new site for political and cultural conflicts that
were already in play?
....
. . . We do not have the luxury to wait for this moment to settle more firmly into historical
memory. Understanding September 11 and its impact is a need, and a responsibility, of our
own.
Mary L. Dudziak, Introduction to SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A WATERSHED MOMENT? 1, 2, 8 (Mary
L. Dudziak ed., 2003).
79
For perhaps the best such account, see PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A
COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1998). It is significant that Professor Heymann’s post-9/11 book, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR (2003),
gives up on the crime strategy for confronting terrorism and instead attempts to argue that in the “war”
on terrorism, multilateral strategies and international law should guide American conduct.
80
As this article was in the editing stage, new information about the Clinton-era anti-terrorism tactics emerged, showing that the Clinton White House had in fact been pursuing more military options
than were apparent at the time or in the several years after 9/11. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, STAFF STATEMENT NO. 6: THE MILITARY (2004), http://www.9-
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Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and ordinary criminal courts, even when
they pertained to attacks on U.S. interests overseas. Under the Bush administration, terrorist attacks have been seen within the framework of not
just a small war, but of a world war. Along with that framework has come
a reluctance to actively use or even to acquiesce in the jurisdiction of the
courts,81 and a sense that the Department of Defense (“DOD”), the military,
and the intelligence agencies patrol the front lines, even within the United
States.
Under the Clinton administration, the attacks on two American embassies in Africa on the same day in 1998—one in Kenya and the other in
Tanzania—were treated as both war and crime. Several cruise missiles
were launched on locations in Afghanistan and Sudan to get rid of what had
been flagged as al Qaeda sites. But the most sustained treatment of the
embassy bombings framed them as a large criminal conspiracy. Eventually, four defendants—including one American citizen—were tried in the
federal District Court for the Southern District of New York in the spring
of 2001 for plotting and participating in the attacks. Several months of evidence—including reports from FBI field officers, results of electronic
monitoring, physical evidence obtained through searches in multiple countries, and confessions gathered in extensive interrogations abroad—resulted
in convictions of all four defendants on all counts.82 Other trials were conducted and resulted in guilty verdicts in the case of the first World Trade
Center bombing, the plot to blow up major sites in New York City, and the
plot to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport on the eve of the millennium. All were found to be al Qaeda-related conspiracies.83

11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/staff_statement_6.pdf; NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES, STAFF STATEMENT NO. 7: INTELLIGENCE POLICY (2004), http://www.911commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/staff_statement_7.pdf; RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL
ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR (2004).
81
George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address in January 2004 stated the case strongly:
I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all. They view terrorism
more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments. After
the World Trade Center was first attacked in 1993, some of the guilty were indicted and tried
and convicted, and sent to prison. But the matter was not settled. The terrorists were still training and plotting in other nations, and drawing up more ambitious plans. After the chaos and
carnage of September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they got.
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
82
See United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The transcript of the trial
in which the specific uses of evidence can be seen is available at Transcript available at
http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/background.html.
83
The evidence presented at the trial of the so-called Millennial Bomber is laid out in Frontline:
Trail of a Terrorist (PBS television documentary, Oct. 25, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/etc/script.html). The first World Trade Center
bombing and the subsequent foiled plots by Ramzi Yousef, who is believed to have masterminded that
bombing, are detailed in SIMON REEVE, THE NEW JACKALS: RAMZI YOUSEF, OSAMA BIN LADEN AND
THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM (1999).
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It appeared from the Clinton administration’s antiterrorism efforts that
it believed the ordinary criminal justice system was an effective tool for ensuring that those who plotted against the United States and attempted to kill
its citizens could be brought to justice on the basis of public evidence in
normal criminal proceedings. And the results—guilty verdicts in all
cases—seemed to bear that belief out. From the standpoint of Schmitt’s
political theory, the 1990s terrorist attacks were deemed by the administration then in power to require no state of exception. Instead, the United
States showed itself to be aggressively unexceptional in these circumstances, treating these attacks on the country through normal procedures as
a way of making a point that the terrorists could not destroy American constitutional values.84 Of course, the situation was being monitored to determine if the threat rose to the level of a military response, but by and large,
plots within the United States were thwarted using ordinary policing methods,85 and their perpetrators were put on trial throughout the 1990s.
84

That said, there were some elements of these al Qaeda trials that should give human rights lawyers pause. The confessions that were the centerpiece of the African embassy bombing trials were obtained through interrogations lasting weeks in some cases, and in every case without a lawyer present.
All of the defendants signed statements saying that they waived their right to counsel, but the only evidence offered that the confessions made by two of them were voluntary or that the defendants understood what they were signing came from the interrogators themselves. Thereafter, the confessions were
introduced into evidence through the testimony of the interrogators, who often spent days on the witness stand apparently quoting the exact words of the defendants, even though everyone admitted that no
tape recorder was used and that the investigators only took notes detailing their conversations after the
interrogations were over—sometimes days and weeks later. The issue of whether the U.S. Constitution’s right to counsel applied to noncitizens interrogated abroad by U.S. officials seems to have been
an issue of first impression in this case. See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 181, 187–89. In his decision, Judge Sand elaborated a modified version of the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (holding that prosecutors may not use statements made during custodial interrogation unless the
defendant was first advised of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel), for interrogations of noncitizens conducted by U.S. officers abroad. Id. at 188 n.16. In addition, some of the
searches conducted abroad that netted evidence for this trial were conducted without even superficial
compliance with Fourth Amendment guarantees. Whether the constitutional procedures for gathering
evidence apply to evidence gathered abroad more generally is a controversial proposition. See M.K.B.
Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 319 (2003) (discussing the changing situation of Miranda warnings after 9/11); Mark A.
Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The International Arena: A Critical Analysis of United States v.
Bin Laden, and a Proposal for a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2002) (analyzing
and mapping out proposals for how to apply Miranda rights internationally); Roberto Iraola, SelfIncrimination and the Non-Resident Alien, 22 PACE L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing applications of the
self-incrimination doctrine to non-resident aliens); Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, Coordinated
Criminal Investigations Between the United States and Foreign Governments and Their Implications
for American Constitutional Rights, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 821 (2002) (discussing the interplay between the
United States and foreign governments on American constitutional rights); Jay Shapiro, Terrorism, the
Constitution, and the Courts, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 189 (2002) (discussing the application of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to terrorists); Frank Tuerkheimer, Globalization of U.S. Law Enforcement: Does the Constitution Come Along?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 307 (2002) (discussing the use of American constitutional values in dealing with foreign governments).
85
This may not be completely true, as ordinary criminal investigations were giving way at a rapid
pace to national security investigations. The number of warrants issued by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISC”) went up sharply in the 1990s, perhaps because of an increased focus on
terrorism investigations. When Clinton came to power, about 500 warrants were granted annually for
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The 9/11 attacks changed that calculation, but not immediately. At
first, the Bush administration’s DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) acted as if the normal legal model were still in play.86 Two of
the first concrete suspects in U.S. custody in the new war on terrorism—
Zacarias Moussaoui and John Walker Lindh—were charged with crimes in
normal criminal proceedings even though their alleged criminal activity involved participation in terrorist plots.87
Moussaoui was publicly announced to have been the “twentieth hijacker” on the presumption of symmetry—three of the four hijacked planes
on 9/11 had five hijackers, but one only had four. Moussaoui, who was arrested prior to 9/11, had been originally thought by the DOJ to have been
slotted for that fifth seat on the fourth plane. Since the case began, it has
become less clear that Moussaoui was a hijacker. Instead, it seems that
Moussaoui was probably an al Qaeda member in the United States awaiting
instructions that never came for some further attack.88 Moreover, the
Moussaoui case has become difficult for the DOJ because Moussaoui has
claimed the right to interrogate other high-level al Qaeda operatives who
are in U.S. custody, particularly Ramzi bin al-Shibh.89 Bin al-Shibh has
publicly claimed credit for organizing the 9/11 attacks and may have said
that Moussaoui had nothing to do with them.90 Judge Brinkema, the trial
FISA searches. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders
1979–2002 [hereinafter FISA Statistics], at http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html
(last modified May 6, 2003). By 2000, that number had doubled to 1012. Id. Since no FISA warrant
documents are public, it is impossible to say for sure what caused the increase, but given the evident
concern in the Clinton White House with antiterrorism issues, it would not be far-fetched to suppose
that the FISA warrant increase tracked the increased hunt for foreign terrorists inside the United States.
86
The FBI’s investigation procedures did not seem to change immediately after 9/11. Later, on
May 30, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued new guidelines for the FBI to follow in its terrorism investigations, which substantially lowered the showing necessary to use intrusive means of surveillance in terrorism investigations. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., DOJ, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE
INVESTIGATIONS
(2002)
[hereinafter
ASHCROFT
GUIDELINES],
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf.
87
The level of security and publicity that these cases received was, of course, far from normal.
Likewise, the Attorney General’s statements about the heinous activities of both went beyond the normal commentary practices of the office. Ashcroft said that Lindh’s “allegiance to those fanatics and
terrorists never faltered, not even with the knowledge that they had murdered thousands of his countrymen.” Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad: Why Did the Government’s Case Against John Walker Lindh
Collapse?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50. Ashcroft labeled Moussaoui’s indictment a “chronicle
of evil.” Naftali Bendavid, PR War Rages in Terror Cases: U.S., Defense Lawyers Battle Relentlessly
for Public Sympathy, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 2002, § 1, at 12. In general, though, both cases started off as
normal serious crimes. In the end, both cases fell victim to post-9/11 particularities.
88
In fact, at one stage in the proceedings, Moussaoui appeared to attempt to confess to just this set
of facts. Transcript of Arraignment and Motions Hearing, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d
480 (E.D. Va. 2003) (No. Crim. 01-455-A), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/transcripts/text_moussaoui.htm.
89
See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Future of Terror Case Is in Judge’s Hands as Government Continues To
Block Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at A11 (describing Moussaoui’s attempts to interview bin
al-Shibh).
90
Id. (“Mr. Moussaoui has insisted that he had nothing to do with the [September 11th] attacks and
that Mr. bin al-Shibh could help prove his innocence.”).
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judge assigned to the case, has insisted that Moussaoui have access to potentially exculpatory evidence as the normal rules of criminal procedure require, but the government has insisted that national security would be compromised by Moussaoui’s access to bin al-Shibh’s testimony even under
the restricted terms that Judge Brinkema approved.91 When the government openly refused to provide Moussaoui access to exculpatory witnesses,
Judge Brinkema dropped those charges against Moussaoui that would have
implicated him in the 9/11 attacks and that therefore would have carried the
death penalty. She left in place charges that Moussaoui was a member of al
Qaeda but ordered that no evidence of Moussaoui’s connection with 9/11
could be presented at trial.92 This ruling was, for the most part, upheld on
appeal.93 However, the final legal resolution is far from clear. One possibility, hinted at in the press, is that the government will use the dropped
charges as a reason for classifying Moussaoui with the Guantánamo Bay
detainees, eligible only for a military tribunal where such rules about access to exculpatory evidence do not apply.94
John Walker Lindh was an American citizen captured while fighting
with the Taliban in Afghanistan. At first he was charged with multiple
counts that included charges of al Qaeda membership and participation in a
knowing attack on an American CIA officer. The plea bargain that was
eventually negotiated saw Lindh plead only to having fought with the Taliban while carrying a gun. Because Lindh was an American citizen, he was
initially handled through ordinary criminal procedure and his father, a lawyer clever about both the legal and political options available at the time,
organized a vigorous legal defense that called the government’s bluff about
the concrete evidence they had against Lindh. Virtually all of the evidence
91

Judge Brinkema never required that bin al-Shibh be present in court, but instead ruled that Moussaoui’s right to compel witnesses on his behalf was satisfied if U.S. officials asked bin al-Shibh the
relevant questions in whatever location they deemed appropriate. United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F.
Supp. 2d 480, 487 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d in part and vacated in part, No. 03-4792, 2004 WL 868261
(4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2004). Since the government refused to do even this, the judge dropped all 9/11related charges against Moussaoui. Order, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va.
2003)
(No.
Crim.
01-455-A),
available
at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss82903ord.pdf .
92
Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
93
United States v. Moussaoui, No. 03-4792, 2004 WL 868261 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2004). The Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Judge Brinkema’s conclusion that Moussaoui should be
granted access to exculpatory witnesses, but remanded the case to the district court to “craft substitutions under certain guidelines.” Id. at *21. Specifically, the court instructed defense counsel to identify
the portions of summarized deposition testimony that Moussaoui wants to admit into evidence and permitted the government to argue for the inclusion of additional portions “in the interest of completeness.” Id. The court was clear, however, that the government is not to “attempt to use the substitutions
to bolster its own case by offering what it considers to be inculpatory statements” and that the substitutions “may be admitted only by Moussaoui.” Id.
94
The rules of evidence that will be in use at the military tribunals indicate at section 8: “The Accused may obtain witnesses and documents for the Accused’s defense, to the extent necessary and reasonably available as determined by the Presiding Officer.” This access may be limited in order to safeguard “protected information” and to protect state secrets. DOD, MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER NO. 1
(2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/dod032102milcomord1.pdf.
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consisted of Lindh’s own statements, gathered in conditions that were arguably coercive. The battle in an ordinary criminal courtroom might have
found (not certainly, but perhaps) that Lindh’s self-incriminating statements were excludable because of the government’s own misconduct in
acquiring them. The government refused, for example, to provide Lindh
with needed medical assistance until he told investigators what he knew
and also refused to notify him that his father had hired a lawyer on his behalf.95 Had these failures been judged to constitute coercion in producing
the incriminating statements, the government’s case would have been substantially weakened. Even if the statements were ruled admissible in the
end, the government’s handling of Lindh looked bad, and there was television footage plus an internal leak from the DOJ as proof.96 Seeing the
weakness of their position, the DOJ bargained, a sure sign of business as
usual in the criminal justice system.
So far, the handling of Moussaoui and Lindh through criminal indictment and conviction generally has shown the government’s commitment to
using ordinary criminal process where it can, just as the Clinton administration had done. But there were two early signs even in these cases that the
previous status quo for handling terrorists was changing. One came in matters of jurisdiction. While almost all of the Clinton-era terrorism cases
were handled in the Southern District of New York, which by then had developed both the security apparatus and the expertise in investigating and
prosecuting al Qaeda-related crimes, the new cases were brought in a far
more conservative federal jurisdiction, the Eastern District of Virginia.
The Southern District of New York could have been used as a venue since
it included the World Trade Center and was the location of the primary
grand jury that was convened after 9/11 to investigate the attacks. But the
DOJ decided instead to hold the trials in the district of the Pentagon attacks, where it could be expected that any random jury would have in it a
number of military families and other federal civil servants who were no
doubt thought to be more sympathetic to the government’s position than
New York liberals. Moreover, appeals from the Eastern District of Virginia go to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, widely thought to be the
most conservative federal circuit court.97 The jurisdictional changes did
not signal a breakdown of the normal rules; complex federal cases often
95

A DOJ lawyer, Jennifer Radack, went public with the information that she and others in the DOJ
had given the advice to the FBI agents interrogating Lindh in Afghanistan that Lindh had to be told of
counsel hired on his behalf and had to be given the right to have counsel present if he so desired.
Mayer, supra note 87, at 58–59.
96
Radack, the whistle-blowing DOJ lawyer, has since been dismissed and alleges that her future
employment has been blocked by government officials trying to retaliate against her. All Things Considered: Lindh Whistle-Blower Sees Smear Campaign (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 20, 2004).
97
Given the split within American legal conservatism between social conservatives who tend to be
deferential to authority and libertarian conservatives who are not, a conservative federal court did not
necessarily guarantee that the Bush administration would prevail in its “state of exception” arguments.
But it was a surer bet than the more ideologically diverse Second Circuit that the Southern District of
New York appeals would have reached.
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present a legitimate choice of venue. But they did signal that the previous
standard operating procedures were under challenge from within the DOJ
and that there had been a conscious decision not to follow Clinton-era practice by locating the trials in New York.
The other early warning signal that the handling of terrorism suspects
was changing came in the controversy over whether John Walker Lindh
should have been able to consult with the lawyer his father had hired for
him when Lindh was interrogated in Afghanistan. In Clinton-era practice,
the DOJ’s position had apparently been that suspects interrogated abroad
did have the right to counsel and had to be given Miranda warnings
(though in practice counsel turned out not to be available).98 The African
embassy bombings trial prominently featured confessions on the part of
two of the four defendants, confessions made without a lawyer present.
But in those cases, there was no evidence that counsel had been alerted to
the suspects’ detention and were trying to reach them. Moreover, the African embassy bombing defendants questioned abroad were not U.S. citizens
and had never before set foot in the United States, making their only connection with the United States the fact that they would be tried there. Even
that was sufficient for Judge Sand to rule that Miranda warnings had to be
given and that counsel had to be offered, consistent with local availability.
Though the judge ruled that the part of the confession that one of the defendants made before the Miranda warning was given was inadmissible,
the bulk of the confession, which was made after the defendant had signed
away his claims to see counsel, was admissible.99 One might imagine that
since John Walker Lindh was a U.S. citizen with counsel ready to provide
legal advice, the full Miranda protocol would have been required without
adjustment in his case. Both alternative explanations for the counsel-less
interrogation that Lindh endured—that either the agents in the field did not
get the information that Lindh had counsel or that the DOJ knew but explicitly blocked this information from getting to Lindh100—foreshadowed
some of the hardball tactics that were to come in denying counsel to those
suspected of involvement with terrorism post-9/11.101 Arguably, the non98

The Clinton-era practice can be seen most clearly in the testimony of the FBI agents John Anticev
and Stephen Gaudin in the embassy bombings trial, United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). See also Transcript, supra note 82. According to these agents, each of the foreign
defendants had been informed of their right to counsel, told that there was no counsel that was practically available to them when interrogated abroad, and then given the option of either going forward
with the interrogation or refusing to talk. The potentially coercive part of these interrogations could be
seen when suspects were told that if they refused to talk to American officials, they would be questioned instead by local officials, whose sense of proper interrogation protocol might be, to say the least,
less polite. Not surprisingly, the suspects agreed to talk to the FBI agents. See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp.
2d at 173-81.
99
Id. at 194.
100
For evidence of the latter position, see Mayer, supra note 87, at 50.
101
Counsel has been routinely denied to those suspected of being enemy combatants, both at
Guantánamo and within the United States. Moreover, those rounded up after 9/11 in a preventive detention sweep were routinely denied access to counsel in practical terms, according to the report of the
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American suspects in the embassy bombings case were given more constitutional protection than John Walker Lindh was given, even though, as later
reports seem to indicate, Lindh had less clear involvement with the terrorists than had the embassy bombing suspects.
The normal rules of operating procedure for treating terrorists as criminals broke down altogether after 9/11 in a general round-up of terrorism
suspects, most of whom were Muslim men from countries where al Qaeda
was active. Overtly pretextual reasons were used for detaining suspects for
whom there was very little (and often no) concrete evidence of their involvement with terrorism but whose suspiciousness to federal officials
made them targets of investigation anyway.102 As then-Assistant Attorney
General Michael Chertoff was quoted as saying, the policy of the DOJ in
the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was that “we have to hold these people until we find out what is going on.”103 Within weeks after the terrorist attacks, it appears that at least 1200 men104 were rounded up and detained, in
many cases for many months.105 No serious terrorism charge was brought
against any of them—all were eventually absolved of direct involvement in
9/11-related activities (at least as far as has been made public).106 But
many of the detainees were deported on the basis of immigration violations, some being quite minor (though it is hard to tell for sure since most

Office of the Inspector General. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. (“OIG”), DOJ, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 130-142 (2003) [hereinafter
OIG REPORT], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf.
102
For the most thorough evidence to date on the detention of non-Americans after 9/11, see the OIG
REPORT, id., required by Congress under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.), which painted a damning portrait of the pretextual reasons for extended detentions of terrorism suspects who were later cleared.
103
See OIG REPORT, supra note 101, at 39 (quoting Alice Fisher, head of immigration issues for the
Criminal Division of the DOJ). Michael Chertoff has since been confirmed to a seat on the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
104
The exact figures are not known because the government stopped counting at 1200, after the
ever-increasing number had caused much interest from the press. According to the OIG Report, “the
Public Affairs Office stopped reporting the cumulative totals after the number reached approximately
1,200, because the statistics became confusing.” Id. at 1 n.2. The actual totals will probably never be
known.
105
The OIG Report indicates that, of the 762 detainees who entered the OIG’s purview in this report
because they were involved with the immigration system, 89 were held for at least three months, 53
were held for at least four months, 33 were held for at least five months, and another 18 were held for
more than six months. But 130 of the 762 cases were coded as having “missing values” because the
Inspector General’s office was not able to determine how long the men in question had been confined.
Id. at 52 tbl.3.
106
The fact that so many were deported is probably a sign that they were not considered dangerous.
It is hard to imagine that the U.S. government would be convinced that someone was involved with terrorism and then would send them off to plot from afar. But the case of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen
deported by the United States to Syria where he claims he was tortured for information, presents another possibility of what may have happened with the deportees. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial,
Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 1:04-CV-00249-DGT (E.D.N.Y. 2004), available at http://www.ccrny.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/ArarComplaint.pdf.
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of the deportation hearings were closed upon the insistence of the DOJ).107
Other 9/11 detainees were charged with crimes unrelated to terrorism,
though the maximum sentences in some of the minor crimes were less than
the length of time that the suspect was held in custody awaiting resolution
of these cases.108 Still others were held as “material witnesses” to testify
before the grand jury convened after 9/11 to hear terrorism-related evidence, though not all of them actually testified in the end.109
In the meantime, the DOJ’s own Office of the Inspector General found
credible evidence that some of the 9/11 domestic detainees had been beaten
while in custody, and that normal rules about access to counsel, bond hearings, and notification of family members were honored primarily in the
breach.110 In the post-9/11 roundup of Muslim men, the average length of
detention was eighty days, and more than 25% of the detainees were held
for more than three months.111 Even after deportation orders were given,
many of the detainees were still held in U.S. custody to allow investiga107

The DOJ took the view that all hearings of the 9/11 detainees were to be summarily closed to the
public and to the press since national security information might be released. This claim met different
fates in different circuits. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the DOJ argument, insisting that
each hearing had to be presumptively open until such time as the government could demonstrate that
the release of a specific piece of national-security sensitive information warranted the closure of the
hearing. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). But the Third Circuit came
out the other way, upholding the government’s claim to close all hearings without having to make an
individualized showing. See N.J. Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
108
E.g., United States v. Oulai, No. 02-00046-CR-J-20-TE (M.D. Fla. 2002) (unreported decision),
aff’d, 88 Fed. Appx. 384 (11th Cir. 2003) (unpublished table decision). Tony Oulai was a Roman
Catholic from West Africa who had been detained trying to board a flight in the United States with
flight manuals, “Arabic language materials,” and a stun gun in his checked luggage. He admitted the
flight materials and stun gun, but claimed that the foreign language material in question was a French
Bible. He was held first as a material witness in the terrorism investigation, then detained on immigration charges which turned out to be unfounded, and finally was jailed because he had allegedly lied to
immigration officials who questioned him during his detention. By the time motions were being filed
prior to trial on this offense, he had already been held for eight months even though the maximum sentence for the crime with which he was charged was six months. Also, the crime for which he was eventually convicted—lying to immigration officials—would arguably not have occurred if he had not been
detained in harsh conditions in the first place. For the details of this case, see Amy Goldstein, ‘I Want
to Go Home’: Detainee Tony Oulai Awaits End of 4-Month Legal Limbo, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2002,
at A1; Amy Goldstein, No Longer a Suspect, But Still a Detainee: U.S. Won’t Release or Deport Prisoner, WASH. POST, May 27, 2002, at A1; Amy Goldstein, No Longer Material Witness, West African
Still Detained, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2002, at A17; and Jim Schoettler, September Detainee Cleared of
Terrorist Activity: Visitor Still Faces Charge, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Apr. 2, 2002.
109
The use of material witness warrants for grand jury proceedings was sharply contested and produced within a few months of each other conflicting district court opinions in the same district on the
question of whether material witnesses could be detained indefinitely in conjunction with a grand jury
proceeding. The Second Circuit resolved the conflict by ruling in favor of the government’s position
that the material witness statute could be used in this way. Compare United States v. Awadallah, 202 F.
Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that an innocent person cannot be detained to secure grand jury
testimony under the material witness statute), rev’d, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003), with In Re Application
of the United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that
the material witness statutes does apply to grand jury witnesses).
110
OIG REPORT, supra note 101, at 111-85.
111
Id. at 51.
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tions to continue.112 The result was, in practice, a regime of preventive detention—the holding of suspects in terrorism investigations without terrorism charges and without a sufficient showing of evidence to legally justify
the detentions on that basis.113 Knowing that such a system of pure preventive detention would not be constitutionally permissible for long in the
United States, the DOJ adopted a policy of “preventive prosecution”114 in
which those suspected of involvement in terrorism would be charged with
whatever violation was ready at hand, such as credit card fraud or “spitting
on the sidewalk.”115 The fig leaf of legality in the post-9/11 context grew
primarily from the insincere assertion that terrorism suspects were really
being held for other criminal or administrative investigations, most commonly for immigration violations. In the war on terrorism, the real reason
for holding the suspects was often not explicitly charged; instead, the reasons presented to judges for detention were invented to simply hold the
suspects in prison until such time as the government deemed them safe to
release.116
The next departure from previously normal standards came with the development of new guidelines for surveillance and investigation of terrorism-related activities. While the USA PATRIOT Act has gotten much of
the attention in the public criticism of the Bush administration’s approach
112

According to the OIG Report, the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) had produced a memorandum opinion in which it determined that the ninety-day period within which removal of a deportable
alien should be accomplished was not mandatory if the alien’s continued detention was “supported by
purposes related to the proper implementation of immigration laws.” Id. at 106. The memorandum
concluded that the detainees were held properly because they were still not yet cleared for terrorist connections, a proper purpose under the immigration laws. As a result, the ninety-day period for removal
could be indefinitely extended, according to the OLC. Id.
113
Id. at 91–110.
114
The term and the policy were explained by Viet Dinh in his presentation at the annual meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools in Atlanta, Ga. on January 3, 2004. Confirmed in email message to author 24 May 2004. In his Leventhal Lecture before the DC Bar, Dinh further detailed the
importance of prevention strategies after 9/11. Viet Dinh, “Ordered Liberty in an Age of International
Terrorism.”
Harold
Leventhal
Lecture,
7
June
2002.
Available
at
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/sections/administrative_law_and_agency_practice/dinh.cfm .
115
Shortly after 9/11, Attorney General Ashcroft announced that aggressive prosecution of minor
offenses would in fact be his policy:
Robert Kennedy's Justice Department, it is said, would arrest mobsters for spitting on the sidewalk
if it would help in the battle against organized crime. It will be the policy of this Department of Justice to use same aggressive arrest and detention tactics in the war against terror. Let the terrorists
among us be warned: If you overstay your visas, even by one day, we will arrest you. If you violate a
local law, we will hope that you will and work to make sure that you are put in jail and be kept in
custody as long as possible. We will use every available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial
advantage. We will use all our weapons within the law and under the Constitution to protect life
and enhance security for America.
Morning Edition: President Bush, Tom Ridge and John Ashcroft on Ways to Right Terrorism (NPR
radio broadcast,, Oct 25, 2001).
116
What I have not been able to figure out, however, is whether judges presiding over criminal proceedings on charges of credit card fraud or perjury, for example, were told about the suspicions of terrorist activities before or during the trial, or at sentencing time.
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to the 9/11 investigations, much of what the USA PATRIOT Act contained
was nothing particularly new, even though it might be justifiably described
as disturbing.117 Moreover, the new powers were generally attached to sunset provisions that expire at the end of 2005. As the Federalist Society
White Paper on the criminal procedure provisions of the USA PATRIOT
Act put it, “[t]he criminal procedure and related sections of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 generally do not ‘push the envelope’ of constitutional limits.”118 The Act did, however, codify practices that had previously been fixed only in court decisions, which makes these practices
harder to change after the crisis has passed. Further, some of the provisions
were both new and alarming.
The USA PATRIOT Act codified the cramped understanding of the
Fourth Amendment search and seizure provision as it had been developed
in successive judicial retreats from Warren Court precedents—that only
nonconsensual,119 particularly intrusive120 searches required full-scale
“probable cause” warrants under the Fourth Amendment.121 Other searches

117

See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered titles of
U.S.C.). By pointing out that many of the USA PATRIOT Act’s provisions constituted nothing new, I
do not mean to imply that they are not serious. But after the high point of the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure jurisprudence, the tendency of American courts had been to restrict rights granted to criminal
defendants, particularly with respect to defendants’ rights in the course of criminal investigations. As a
result, many of the “rights” that the USA PATRIOT Act appeared to limit had already been scaled back
by courts. Just as the National Security Act represented “nothing new” in placing control of foreign
affairs directly into the hands of the president after a particularly hardball interpretation of United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), so the USA PATRIOT Act did little new, legally
speaking, in consolidating the growing set of already defendant-hostile federal court decisions.
118
KENT SCHEIDEGGER ET AL., FEDERALIST SOCIETY WHITE PAPER ON THE USA PATRIOT ACT OF
2001: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SECTIONS, 2001 FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR L. & PUB. POL’Y STUD. 17,
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/TerrorCrimPro.pdf.
119
“Nonconsensual” is defined in this area of constitutional criminal procedure as surveillance without the consent of any of the parties to the interactions. So, if one person agrees to wear a microphone
in order to record the conversation of another person, the recording is considered “consensual” even if
the bugged party didn’t agree to it. Such surveillance did not require a probable cause warrant in normal criminal investigatory practice before 9/11.
120
“Particularly intrusive” searches are those that involve physically entering a private dwelling or
recording conversations in a nonconsensual manner, or otherwise (for example, virtually) monitoring a
person’s activities in private places. Observing someone in public, gaining access to information about
a person through means available to the general public, or gathering information with the consent of
someone who does have legitimate access to the information did not require a warrant before 9/11.
121
The USA PATRIOT Act authorized the approval of “roving searches” in which a court in Jurisdiction X is now empowered to authorize a wiretap on all of the phones of a particular target, even the
phones that were not in Jurisdiction X. This provision was urged to streamline the prior process in
which separate warrants were required in each jurisdiction where there was a target phone. See USA
PATRIOT Act § 216 (regarding trap and trace orders). The principle of roving searches was extended
to physical searches in Section 219 and to email content in Section 220.
For a particularly helpful review of the circumstances under which warrants were not required for
search, detention and arrest under federal criminal procedure before the USA PATRIOT Act, see Theodore P. Metzler et al., Thirtieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 89 GEO. L.J. 1084 (2001).
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(including examining private databases,122 monitoring public places, and
interviewing friends and acquaintances) did not require probable cause
warrants even before the USA PATRIOT Act went into effect, and the
USA PATRIOT Act could be seen as simply consolidating these judicial
understandings. Some, though significantly not all, courts had previously
agreed that “sneak and peek” searches (in which the target of the search
would not be notified immediately that such a search had occurred) were
not violations of Fourth Amendment search standards before such a provision was included in the USA PATRIOT Act.123

122

For example, prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, it had not been clear whether telephone and electronic communications (cable and Internet) providers had to notify their customers when
law enforcement officers asked for personally identifiable information. Now it is clear that law enforcement may require communications providers to keep such information secret from the targets of
the investigation. This provision does not sunset. The USA PATRIOT Act still allows cable operators
to keep private video subscription records. DOYLE, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 11. Service providers
were already under obligation to assist law enforcement when asked. Id. at 19.

123

The circuits were divided on this issue before Congress wrote the USA PATRIOT Act. The
Fourth Circuit had already ruled that delayed notification of searches and seizures of intangible evidence were not violations of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th
Cir. 2000). But the Ninth Circuit had said that they were unconstitutional. See United States v. Freitas,
800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit took a position somewhere in between, declining to
address the constitutional question by locating the disclosure requirement in Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993). In a related
context, the Supreme Court has held in the “knock and announce” situation that police do not have to
announce their entry into a dwelling beforehand if “it would inhibit the effective investigation of the
crime.” See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). More recently, the Court held that a
fifteen- to twenty-second pause between the knock and announcement and a forcible entry passes constitutional muster if the police believe that evidence may be destroyed with a longer delay. See United
States v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 521, 526 (2003). If the Court would countenance police knocking down the
door without announcing themselves first or waiting only the briefest time after doing so, it seems hard
to imagine that the Court would require the police to announce surreptitious searches in the absence of
the target contemporaneously with the search. The “sneak and peek” provision of the USA PATRIOT
Act does not sunset.
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FISA124 had already allowed senior FBI officials to gain access to the

124

FISA was passed in 1978 as a way of regularizing American spying on foreign spies. Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 101-11, 92 Stat. 1783, 1783-96 (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–11 (2000)). But the reach of FISA includes all those who are “agents
of foreign powers.” A “foreign power” is, significantly, not limited to governments. As defined in
FISA, a “foreign power” is:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United
States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States persons;
or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (2000).
Part 5 is of particular concern since any foreign-based political organization—Amnesty International, the Human Rights Committee of the International Bar Association, or the Catholic Church, for
example—could easily count as a foreign power under this definition.
An “agent of a foreign power” is defined in FISA as:
(1) any person other than a United States person, who—
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a member of
a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) [see above—this is a reference to terrorist
groups];
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States, when the circumstances of such person’s presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage
in such activities in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in
such activities; or
(2) any person who—
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a
foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of
the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign
power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of
the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power;
(D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf
of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent
identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or
(E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
Id. § 1801(b).
For the purposes of FISA, a “United States person” includes citizens, permanent resident aliens, organizations consisting primarily of U.S. natural persons, and U.S.-registered corporations. § 1801(i).
As a result, there are laxer standards for spying on those who are not U.S. persons; only their connection to a “foreign power” has to be established. For U.S. persons, evidence of some criminal activity
seems to be required, though § 1801(b)(2)(E) seems to allow the nexus between the individual and
criminal activity to consist only of “aiding or abetting” a crime. All parts of the statute pertaining to
U.S. persons require specific knowledge. For more on FISA, see the Federation of American Scientists’
Intelligence Resource Project’s listing of primary documents. Fed’n of American Scientists, Intelligence
Resource
Project:
Foreign
Intelligence
Surveillance
Act,
at
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records of common carriers, public accommodation providers, physical
storage facility operators, and vehicle rental agencies in their surveillance
of foreign agents before the USA PATRIOT Act.125 The USA PATRIOT
Act extended the range of objects that could be sought to include “any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents and other
items).”126 It also extends the number of officials who may ask for such records.127 The more radical extension of the FISA search provision is that
items that are sought need not directly relate to an identified “foreign
agent,” but may be sought in conjunction with any investigation into international terrorism more generally.128 All that the government must demonstrate in these cases, then, is that the information might be relevant to a terrorism investigation in general, not that it implicates a particular person
who is the target of the FISA warrant. And the government may then insist
that the person or organization on whom the warrant is served not reveal
that the information was ever sought.129 In another change, FISA warrants
previously had to specify the precise locations where the surveillance
would be carried out; under the USA PATRIOT Act, so-called “roving
warrants” are permitted, broadening all FISA warrants to include any location (including locations not named in advance) where the target is likely to
be.130 Such warrants were also extended from having a 90-day limit to having a 120-day limit.131 Nonetheless, all of these provisions broadening the
timing and locations of valid FISA warrants and the set of objects to which
they may apply are set to sunset at the end of 2005 unless they are renewed.132
To my mind, the most worrisome novel aspect of the USA PATRIOT
Act involves the changes the Act made to the threshold standard for getting
a FISA warrant in the first place. Before the USA PATRIOT Act, a FISA
warrant could only be issued upon a government showing that national security surveillance was “the purpose” of the search. This limited FISA
warrants to instances where the government could assert to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) that the surveillance was undertaken exclusively for national security purposes.133
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ (last modified May 6, 2004). See also infra notes 164–175 and
accompanying text.
125
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1810 (2000).
126
USA PATRIOT Act § 215. This provision sunsets through Section 224.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. Unlike in the “sneak and peek” provisions, where the target of the search has to be notified
eventually, even if with a delay, the FISA provisions require perpetual secrecy.
130
Id. § 206. This provision sunsets through Section 224.
131
Id. § 207. This provision sunsets through Section 224.
132
The sunset provision of the USA PATRIOT Act is contained in Section 224.
133
As Peter Swire notes in a forthcoming article, one way that this assertion was to be accomplished
was through the range of signatures that had to appear on the warrant. FISA warrants in their original
form under the 1978 legislation had to contain the signatures not only of the lawyer who drafted the
warrant, but also those of the head of the intelligence agency and the Attorney General personally.
These signatures would reassure the FISA judge that the purpose of the surveillance was what it
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The USA PATRIOT Act, significantly, changed this standard so that
the government need only assert that “a significant purpose” of the requested surveillance is national security.134 This implies that there may be
other purposes for surveillance, such as gathering information for criminal
investigations. While a number of courts had previously admitted in criminal trials evidence collected under the lower probable cause standards attached to FISA surveillance even before the USA PATRIOT Act was
passed,135 there was still a meaningful distinction within the DOJ’s investigatory structure between criminal investigations and national security investigations. Peter Swire explains that this distinction (also known as “the
wall”) originated with FISA and was policed by the head of the Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review (“OIPR”) within the DOJ. Under OIPR’s
strict review, intelligence information was occasionally passed on to the
criminal investigation side for use in trials, and courts had allowed such
evidence to be admitted upon a showing that the information had been
originally collected for bona fide national security purposes in the first
place. As Swire puts it, “there has always been a gate in the wall.”136 Still,
there was a wall. Once the standard for issuing FISA warrants was
changed by the USA PATRIOT Act, it was only a matter of time before the
wall collapsed.
Another clear novelty of the USA PATRIOT Act came in allowing information gathered in the course of a grand jury proceeding to be shared
with intelligence services if it relates to the possibility of foreign attack or
concerns foreign agents that may be spying or planning assaults on U.S. interests.137 Before the Act, grand jury information could only be shared outside the grand jury room for law enforcement purposes.138
Changes were also made by the USA PATRIOT Act in the area of immigration law. The attorney general was given broader powers to detain
aliens without charges--specifically, upon a showing that he has “reasonable grounds to believe” that those detained are engaged in activity that

claimed to be, and not an attempt to obtain evidence for criminal investigations through this less rigorous channel. Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, GEO. WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with author).
134
USA PATRIOT Act § 218.
135
In virtually all published opinions in this area, courts seemed always to admit evidence gathered
under FISA warrants, though they were divided on what the relevant test was to admit this evidence.
Some courts indicated that the original FISA warrant had to indicate that seeking foreign intelligence
information was the purpose of the search (where “the” purpose implied the “only” purpose). United
States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77–78 (2d Cir. 1984). Other courts indicated that evidence collected
under a FISA warrant was admissible in a criminal trial when foreign intelligence gathering was the
“primary purpose” for the warrant. United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1074–76 (4th Cir. 1987).
The “primary purpose” test was first articulated in a pre-FISA case, United States v. Truong Dinh Hung,
629 F.2d 908, 915–16 (4th Cir. 1980). The USA PATRIOT Act significantly changed the relevant test
to “significant purpose.” USA PATRIOT Act § 218.
136
Swire, supra note 133 (manuscript at 20).
137
USA PATRIOT Act § 203.
138
DOYLE, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 7.
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threatens national security.139 The USA PATRIOT Act limits such detentions to seven days. But Attorney General John Ashcroft adopted an emergency interim rule for detaining aliens on less than probable cause for “an
additional reasonable period of time.”140 Given the lengths of time that the
9/11 detainees were held without being charged,141 one might guess that the
government has been operating on the Attorney General’s rule rather than
under the USA PATRIOT Act’s more restrictive provisions.
Probably the biggest changes in preexisting law (at least so far as the
non-security-cleared can tell) came in the area of investigatory methods authorized not by the USA PATRIOT Act, but instead by the curious legal
device known as the “Attorney General Guidelines.”142 It may come as a
surprise to those who have never tracked the technical legal basis of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation that it has never had a charter statute—one
that sets up the institution in law, explains its mission and generally regulates the contours of its mandate. Instead, the FBI, located within the DOJ,
is regulated piecemeal through statutes that provide legal requirements for
particular methods of investigation (e.g., procedures to follow before wiretaps can be authorized are given by statute).143 But no statute governs the
overall shape of investigations and when investigatory tools short of warrant-triggering searches can be used. Instead, these matters are governed
by guidelines of the attorney general.144 These guidelines do not have to
pass a notice-and-comment procedure, and do not exist as formal federal
regulations at all. Any attorney general can modify them at will without
using even the procedure required for the modification of ordinary federal
rules.145

139

USA PATRIOT Act § 412.
Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 287).
141
The OIG Report indicates that about 16% of the detainees in the Fall 2001 roundup were held for
more than ten days without being served with an NTA (notice to appear), which signals the start of the
charging process. (For 15% of those detained, there is missing data.) See OIG REPORT, supra note
101, at 30 tbl.1.
142
On the Attorney General’s Guidelines generally, see John T. Elliff, The Attorney General’s
Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785 (1984), and the set of primary documents
posted on the Electronic Privacy Information Center website at http://www.epic.org/privacy/fbi/.
143
For example, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–20 (2000)), regulates electronic
searches.
144
The practice began with Attorney General Edward Levi after the Church Committee had exposed
the excesses of the FBI’s surveillance programs. See Elliff, supra note 142.
145
They are not, for example, in the Federal Register, and getting copies of the guidelines in effect
before the emergence of the Internet was exceedingly difficult. In the comparisons that follow, I compare Ashcroft’s guidelines with the most recent version that had been used by the DOJ before 9/11,
which were guidelines last amended by Attorney General Dick Thornburgh in 1989. OFFICE OF THE
ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DOJ, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES,
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS (1989) [hereinafter THORNBURGH GUIDELINES], http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/generalcrimea.htm. As one
might imagine, Reagan-era guidelines were already substantially more law-and-order oriented than the
first regulations written under the tenure of Edward J. Levi in the aftermath of the Church Commission
Report. But that comparison is beyond the scope of this article.
140
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In May 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft issued a new version of these
little-noticed guidelines and in so doing made, in my view, even more substantial changes in the normal operating procedure of the FBI in domestic
surveillance and investigation than the USA PATRIOT Act did. Ashcroft’s
guidelines lowered the threshold of suspicion at which agents were allowed
to use informants and undercover activities to find out more, indicating that
only mail openings and nonconsensual electronic surveillance were categorically prohibited at the “preliminary inquiry” stage. Now such intrusive
techniques can be used whenever there is “information or an allegation
which indicates the possibility of criminal activity.”146 Whereas earlier
guidelines required that an FBI agent go through a series of stages, from
checking leads, to initiating a preliminary inquiry, to launching a full investigation, the current guidelines allow agents to move to the full investigation level without going through the earlier stages.147 The guidelines make
explicit the point that “[p]reventing future criminal activity, as well as solving and prosecuting crimes that have already occurred, is an explicitly authorized objective of general crimes investigations”148 and that the standard
for launching a full investigation is a “reasonable indication” that a crime
“has been, is being, or will be committed.”149 To drive the point home, the
Ashcroft guidelines note, as had earlier guidelines, that “[t]he ‘reasonable
indication’ threshold for undertaking such an investigation is substantially
lower than probable cause.”150 The previous guidelines then went on to
say: “However, the standard does require specific facts or circumstances
indicating a past, current, or impending violation. There must be an objective, factual basis for initiating the investigation; a mere hunch is insufficient.”151 The Ashcroft guidelines have dropped that cautionary language.
In fact, more aggressive investigations seem to be actively encouraged in
the post-9/11 version:
The conduct of preliminary inquiries and investigations may present
choices between the use of investigative methods which are more or less intrusive, considering such factors as the effect on the privacy of individuals and potential damage to reputation. Inquiries and investigations shall be conducted
with as little intrusion as the needs of the situation permit. It is recognized,
however, that the choice of techniques is a matter of judgment. The FBI shall
not hesitate to use any lawful techniques consistent with these Guidelines, even

146

ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 1. The previous guidelines indicated that these allegations had to be in writing, a requirement that has apparently been dropped. See THORNBURGH
GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at pt. II(B)(2).
147
ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 2.
148
Id. The previous guidelines added at this point: “With respect to criminal activity that may occur
in the future but does not yet involve current criminal conspiracy or attempt, particular care is necessary
to assure that there exist facts and circumstances amounting to a reasonable indication that a crime will
occur.” THORNBURGH GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at pt. II(C)(2). This sentence has been dropped
from the current guidelines.
149
ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 2.
150
Id.
151
THORNBURGH GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at pt. II(C)(1).
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if intrusive, where the intrusiveness is warranted in light of the seriousness of a
crime or the strength of the information indicating its commission or potential
future commission. This point is to be particularly observed in the investigation of terrorist crimes and in the investigation of enterprises that engage in ter152
rorism.

In addition to changing the level of aggressiveness with which terrorism-related investigations may be initiated, the new guidelines greatly increased the amount of information that may be retained from these investigations by establishing a “database that identifies all preliminary inquiries
and investigations conducted pursuant to these Guidelines and that permits
the prompt retrieval of information concerning the status (open or closed)
and subjects of all such inquiries and investigations.”153 Such a database
appears to be new. Moreover, in addition to this database of FBI-generated
information, another even more sweeping database is authorized by the
guidelines, a database that tracks all information that can be discovered
about suspected terrorists:
[The database is authorized to contain] pertinent information from any source
permitted by law, including information derived from past or ongoing investigative activities; other information collected or provided by governmental entities, such as foreign intelligence information and lookout list information; publicly available information, whether obtained directly or through services or
resources (whether nonprofit or commercial) that compile or analyze such in154
formation; and information voluntarily provided by private entities.

152

ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 7.
Id. at 21.
154
Id. at 21–22. “Private entities” may sound innocuous enough, but there are private groups which
collect information on their own that the government either would be restricted by federal law in collecting or would have to clear a great many hurdles to gather. The private groups can get this information without such bureaucratic delays and now can provide it on their own initiative to the government,
which can then add it to the governmental databases.
The scope of such “private investigations” can be quite breathtaking, causing them to raise serious
questions about whether the legal frameworks put in place to regulate the FBI, flexible as they are, are
being evaded. As Steven Emerson, head of the Investigative Project, a group specializing in private
investigations of Islamist terrorism, has revealed:
People in law enforcement would regularly come to me with new data, records, and documents.
The most disturbing were the calls I would get from federal law-enforcement agents who had information and wanted to follow up, but were being prevented by their superiors who weren’t interested in these things. More and more, these disgruntled agents turned to us with information
that they weren’t allowed to pursue themselves.
Our operations became more sophisticated and far-reaching. One of the unexplored mountains of evidence we inherited, for example, was the trial exhibits from the first World Trade
Center bombing. Included were the records of thousands of phone calls made by the suspects to
the Middle East and other parts of the world. We knew the individuals who were placing the
calls, but we couldn’t tell who had received them. Yet it was obvious that this was the key to
investigating how far the network of international terrorism had extended.
We divided the list of calls up country by country. Then, we engaged a number of Arabic
speakers and started making cold calls. Every night at midnight—when the tolls were low and it
was daylight on the other side of the world—we would begin dialing numbers in the Middle
East. When someone picked up we would engage him in random, nondescript conversation.
“How are you? How are things going? I’m calling from the U.S. Do you want to know what’s
happening here?” One way or another we tried to get them to talk to us.
153
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In addition to creating new databases for storing information about terrorist suspects and terrorism investigations, the guidelines also indicate that
the FBI will be authorized (in a change of policy) to “visit any place and
attend any event that is open to the public,” as well as “to conduct online
search activity and to access online sites and forums on the same terms and
conditions as members of the public generally.”155 These practices had
been explicitly disallowed under the previous guidelines because undercover infiltration of political groups had previously led to shocking abuses.
What is disturbing about the Ashcroft guidelines in the context of a discussion about emergency powers is how unaccountable they are to anything resembling a democratic process. The attorney general can change
policy quite radically on just his own say-so without either congressional
approval or even a rule-making process that requires public input. And

More than 49 out of 50 calls would be a dead end. The person answering would hang up or
wouldn’t have any idea of what we were talking about. But that one in fifty proved to be a
treasure trove of information. At one point we ended up talking to the son of blind Sheikh Omar
Abdel Rahman, the infamous Jersey City imam who plotted a day of terror for Manhattan. Another time we reached the spiritual leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Little by little it became obvious that all these groups were coordinating their effort in a worldwide network.
Then one day the phone rang, and we hit an absolute gold mine. The caller was a brave
Sudanese who was a member of the Republican Brotherhood, a group opposed to Dr. Hassan alTurabi’s fundamentalist regime in Sudan. He was now working as a plumber in Brooklyn. He
was in the basement of a building and had just come across scores of boxes of old records that
appeared to be the property of Alkhifa Refugee Center, also known as the Office of Services for
the Mujahideen, the predecessor to Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda international network. The records had apparently been moved there after the World Trade Center bombing from Alkhifa
headquarters at the Al-Farooq Mosque on Atlantic Avenue. He wondered if we would be interested.
We immediately contacted the FBI in New York and Washington. To our utter amazement, they said they couldn’t do anything about it. The field agents were very interested but
when they ran it up to their superiors, they were told it wouldn’t fly. We even smuggled out a
few pages to pique their interest but the superiors would not budge. Then we got word that the
documents were about to be moved or perhaps even destroyed in about five days.
So we decided to pull off our own covert operation. Our Sudanese contact went into the
building at midnight to do his job carrying several large toolboxes. He then immediately emptied the toolboxes and filled them with documents. We met him at the rear of the building in a
rented van. We grabbed the toolboxes, each containing about 4,000–5,000 documents, and
raced off to a Kinko’s in Manhattan where we spent all night feverishly photocopying the material. Then we would race back to the building by 6:00 A.M. and return them to the plumber so
he could put them back before the building owners showed up for work. We did this for three
straight nights.
The papers contained financial records, address books, information about the fabrication of
passports, and countless other materials showing the Alkhifa Refugee Center’s involvement in
the worldwide jihad movement. When we returned to the building the fourth night, however,
our contact didn’t show up. We waited and waited but by 7:00 A.M. we were very fearful that
something had happened to him. We left and found out later that something had triggered the
building owners’ suspicion and they had caught him. While we were waiting outside he was being questioned and threatened in the basement. He is a tough guy, however, and somehow got
out of it. We ended up keeping the original records instead of copies. Altogether, we only retrieved about one-quarter of the information that was there, but it was great material. We got
thousands of leads. Nonetheless, I still think it would have been much better had the FBI gone
in.
STEVEN EMERSON, AMERICAN JIHAD: THE TERRORISTS LIVING AMONG US 19–22 (2002).
155
ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 22.
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given the secrecy surrounding the authorized investigations, it will be difficult for anyone illegally surveilled to challenge the practices until visible
damage has been done. Since the guidelines were issued, Attorney General
Ashcroft shows every sign of expanding his powers as far as he can.
Under these new guidelines, Ashcroft pushed the envelope of prior
practice by seeking FISA156 warrants in cases where the clear intent of the
FBI was to engage simultaneously in foreign intelligence collection and
criminal investigation. The USA PATRIOT Act had officially changed the
standard for obtaining FISA warrants from a showing that foreign intelligence was “the purpose” of the surveillance or search to a showing that
foreign intelligence was “a significant purpose” of the investigation.157 The
tricky part, legally speaking, came when FISA warrants were requested in
order to spy not just on non-resident aliens, who have little protection under
FISA, but also on American citizens and green-card holders, who have
more. When FISA was first passed, Congress had inserted a special protection that required the government to “minimize”158 the amount of personal
information gathered and retained on “United States person[s]”159 who
were the targets of FISA warrants. This provision was not amended by the
USA PATRIOT Act. But Attorney General Ashcroft wanted to increase
the amount of information gathered and retained under FISA on U.S. persons for use in criminal investigations related to terrorism. In fact, his
memo on the subject indicated that he took the view that the “significant
purpose” standard newly introduced to FISA through the USA PATRIOT
Act “allows FISA to be used primarily for a law enforcement purpose, as
long as a significant foreign intelligence purpose remains.”160 He indicated
that requests for FISA warrants could originate with the criminal investigation side of the DOJ rather than the intelligence investigation side.161
While the question of who gets to request a FISA warrant may sound
like an arcane organizational matter within the DOJ, it is a distinction of
constitutional importance. The Fourth Amendment applies in full to warrants sought for ordinary criminal searches and surveillance, and the spe156

For the details of FISA warrants, see supra note 124.
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291.
158
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1821(4) (2000).
159
§ 1801(i). This is the term of art used in FISA to refer primarily to American citizens and greencard holders.
160
Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, to Director, FBI, et al., at pt. I (Mar. 6,
2002), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html. The memo indicates that “[t]he
Criminal Division and OIPR [Office of Intelligence Policy and Review] shall have access to all information developed in full field FI [foreign intelligence] and FCI [foreign counterintelligence] investigations,” id. at pt. II.A., which meant that there were, in essence, no minimization procedures that would
consistently redact information about American citizens or green-card holders who came under foreign
intelligence surveillance. While the previous rule was that information would stay within foreign intelligence investigations unless there were special permission to share it with the criminal side, the new
rule implies that all information will be shared unless there are special reasons not to.
161
“Correspondingly, the Attorney General can most effectively direct and control such FI and FCI
investigations only if all relevant DOJ components are free to offer advice and make recommendations,
both strategic and tactical, about the conduct and goals of the investigations.” Id. at pt. I.
157
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cific grounds for getting those warrants is given in Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.162 For Title III surveillance
warrants, the standard is that probable cause be shown that a crime has
been, is being, or is about to be committed before such a warrant shall be
given.163 FISA warrants also have a probable cause standard, but the only
probable cause that must be shown in the case of “non-U.S. persons” is that
the target of the warrant is an agent of a foreign power,164 both an easier
and a different thing to prove. But even though Title III and FISA warrants
both authorize intrusive surveillance, FISA warrants are easier to get in the
first place and more powerful when gotten. FISA warrants are authorized
for longer periods of time, require no notice to the surveilled party, and allow all records of the surveillance to be kept secret, even if the information
is later introduced at trial.165 If all criminal investigations in the terrorism
field can proceed with FISA warrants instead of Title III warrants, then the
Fourth Amendment has been effectively bypassed. By indicating that the
DOJ would share all information between the criminal side and the intelligence investigation side of the department, Ashcroft was proposing to
eliminate altogether the Fourth Amendment requirements that might otherwise apply to terrorism-related searches and surveillance.
And the changes do not just affect aliens. The FISA statute requires
that the information collected and stored on U.S. persons be “minimized,”
which is to say that when citizens and green-card holders are under surveillance, a narrower range of information can be collected in the first place
and this narrower range of information is subject to stricter rules about retention and distribution than would be the case if non-U.S. persons were
under surveillance. As part of his newly aggressive posture post-9/11,
Ashcroft proposed new “minimization procedures” to apply to U.S. persons
in the context of specific applications for FISA warrants before the FISC.166
But the court balked at approving these minimization procedures, even
though the court approved the warrants themselves. This was significant,
because in its nearly twenty-five years of operation, there is no evidence
that the FISC had ever refused to approve the full request of the DOJ.167
162

Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–20 (2000)).
§ 802, 82 Stat. at 218 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000)).
For a more detailed contrast between Fourth Amendment and FISA warrants, see Swire, supra
note 133. For U.S. persons, an additional showing that the target knowingly engage in potentially
criminal activity is also required. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b).
165
Id.
166
The FISC, which was set up by Congress in FISA, is an Article III court staffed with district court
judges who are empowered to approve FISA warrant requests. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000).
167
Though the warrants themselves and everything they produce is secret, under the terms of FISA,
the FISC must report on the number of warrant requests and the number of warrants granted each year.
50 U.S.C. § 1807. These reports are publicly available, and it is from these reports that we can see that
the FISC has never rejected a warrant request. For FISC statistics, see FISA Statistics, supra note 85.
The secrecy surrounding FISA warrants is otherwise so complete that any details of the warrant requests to this court are secret not just at the moment when they are made, but perpetually. Even when
parts of a FISA wiretap are used against a defendant in a criminal case, the defendant may not be al163
164
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Convening an unprecedented en banc panel of all the FISC judges, the
court ruled that the Ashcroft request went too far and that the proposed
unlimited information sharing between those who were authorized to conduct intelligence investigations and those who were authorized to conduct
criminal investigations within the DOJ violated FISA with respect to U.S.
persons,168 Though the court might have gone further to say that the
Ashcroft practices violated the U.S. Constitution by circumventing the
Fourth Amendment altogether, the court refrained from dealing with the
constitutional issues.169
Though the specific warrants requested were in fact issued (with some
modifications pertaining to proposed minimization standards),170 the DOJ
fought the FISC’s judgment on the new minimization procedures by appealing to the never-before-convened Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review (“FISCOR”)171 for a further ruling. FISCOR, in a decision far more sweeping than the decision below, ruled that the USA
PATRIOT Act had changed the ground rules for sharing information between intelligence and criminal investigations and that the DOJ could
therefore get FISA warrants to investigate even U.S. persons regardless of
whether the search or surveillance was used for intelligence purposes or
criminal investigation purposes.172 As long as the search or surveillance
gathered information that could be used for intelligence purposes, criminal
investigation could even be the primary motive for the information.173
With this substantial victory, there is no reason for the DOJ to go the
more onerous Fourth Amendment route to gather information in international terrorism investigations. As a result, the Fourth Amendment “probable cause” standard has been replaced by the FISA “probable cause” standard, which requires only probable cause that the non-U.S. person to be
investigated is an agent of a foreign power, not necessarily that they have
committed or are about to commit a crime. And even though a FISA warrant still requires demonstration of some connection to a criminal activity
in the case of U.S. persons, Ashcroft’s statement that he intends to throw
the book at potential terrorism suspects for “spitting on the sidewalk,” indi-

lowed to see the raw material from which quotations were selected or even to see the original in a foreign language when all that is introduced in court is the translation. For a more detailed explanation,
see Swire, supra note 133 (manuscript at 31).
168
In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611,
625 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002).
169
Id. at 615 (noting that the constitutional issues are not addressed).
170
Under the terms of FISA, an appeal can only be made from denial of a warrant request. 50
U.S.C. § 1803(b). Because the warrant requests in this case were modified before being granted, the
DOJ appealed the modification even though the warrant was granted. This might have raised questions
about whether the decision below could in fact be appealed, but the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review was not deterred from ruling because of this minor point.
171
The FISCOR is another special court created by FISA. See § 1803(b).
172
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 734 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
173
Id. at 731 (noting that the prosecutor’s ability to advise the FBI in intelligence investigations
should not be limited).
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cates that the criminal nexus can be quite minimal. As a result, FISA can
be used quite widely to substitute for the traditional Title III, FourthAmendment-based warrant, even for U.S. citizens and green-card holders.
The impact of this extraordinary change on the application of the Fourth
Amendment to terrorism investigations was itself deliberately minimized
by the FISCOR in the rather stunning statement:
Our case may well involve the most serious threat our country faces. Even
without taking into account the President’s inherent constitutional authority to
conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance, we think the procedures
and government showings required under FISA, if they do not meet the minimum Fourth Amendment warrant standards, certainly come close. We, therefore, believe firmly . . . that FISA as amended is constitutional because the sur174
veillances it authorizes are reasonable.

As the court slipped from requiring that a statute actually meet the tests that
the Constitution sets to being satisfied if the statute “comes close,” the
statutory requirement that there be minimization procedures to redact information gathered about American citizens and green-card holders also
seemed to disappear. The FISCOR decision breathtakingly permitted both
the protections for U.S. persons Congress had put into the Act (and had not
amended with the USA PATRIOT Act) and the more general requirements
of the Fourth Amendment to vanish amid the claims that the country is under serious threat. When this decision was issued in November 2002, more
than a year after the terrorist attacks, the state of emergency became firmly
entrenched.175
The changed trigger mechanisms for when investigations may be performed, who has to approve them, how much judicial oversight they require, and what can be done with the evidence collected are all, in my view,
bigger changes in existing law than those made directly under the USA
PATRIOT Act. They have also moved the United States further and further away from what had been established as the normal operating rules for
domestic criminal and intelligence investigations. Though the Constitution
does not seem to contemplate any situation in which the Fourth Amendment might be suspended in a time of crisis, the Fourth Amendment has effectively been suspended for the purposes of terrorism-related investigations.
Finally, there has been the very serious move away from anything resembling normal procedure in the case of the two U.S. citizens who have
been detained indefinitely without charges, without counsel, and with almost no constitutional review. According to the government, Yaser Hamdi
was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan, taken to the special detainees’ camp at Guantánamo Bay, and then discovered to be a U.S. citizen.176

174

Id. at 746 (emphasis added).
Proceedings before the FISA courts are ex parte proceedings, so there is no knowledgeable losing
party who could appeal this decision. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2000).
176
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003)
175
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He was removed from Guantánamo, taken to the U.S. mainland, and put in
a military jail as an “enemy combatant” without access to counsel and, as
far as the courts have been concerned thus far, without the ability to require
the government to put forward more than a small amount of evidence to
justify his indefinite detention.177 The government has presented as evidence only a second-hand declaration by a political appointee in the DOD
to the effect that Hamdi was indeed captured on the battlefield and has been
classified by the President as an enemy combatant.178 While at a trial this
evidence would be considered multiple hearsay and would not be admissible, this declaration was enough to satisfy the Fourth Circuit, which approved Hamdi’s indefinite detention without counsel, formal charges, or
trial.179 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari and heard arguments on this case.180
The other case of a domestic “enemy combatant” involves José Padilla,
an American citizen of Puerto Rican descent who was born in New York
and convicted of murder in Chicago.181 While in prison, Padilla apparently
converted to Islam, and upon his release, sought to join al Qaeda, according
to the government’s statement. Padilla flew to Pakistan and crossed over
into Afghanistan where he allegedly volunteered his services to al Qaeda,
although it is not clear from the government’s statements in the matter
177

The Fourth Circuit upheld the government’s detention of Hamdi but limited its holding almost
entirely to its asserted facts:
Because it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat in a foreign theater
of conflict, we hold that the submitted declaration is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude
that the Commander in Chief has constitutionally detained Hamdi pursuant to the war powers
entrusted to him by the U.S. Constitution. No further factual inquiry is necessary or proper, and
we remand the case with directions to dismiss the [habeas] petition.
Id. at 459.
As critics of the decision have noted, one reason why the evidence against Hamdi is “undisputed” is
that he was never allowed to meet with a lawyer or to put forward evidence on his own behalf.
178
The “Mobbs Declaration,” named after Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, listed only bare bones facts against Hamdi without indicating sources and without providing vital context. A summary of what the Mobbs Declaration said in Hamdi can be found in
the petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court filed by Hamdi’s lawyer, Frank Dunham, who has
never met his client. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 036696), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/hamdirums100103pet.pdf.
179
On this, even the normally deferential Fourth Circuit almost balked. As the court said:
We did not order the petition [for habeas review] dismissed outright, however, noting our reluctance to “embrac[e] [the] sweeping proposition . . . that, with no meaningful judicial review, any
American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without
charges or counsel on the government’s say-so.” Rather, we sanctioned a limited and deferential inquiry into Hamdi’s status, noting “that if Hamdi is indeed an ‘enemy combatant’ who was
captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the government’s present detention of him is a lawful
one.”
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)) (alterations in
original).
180
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (mem.). The Court heard oral arguments on Wednesday, April 28, 2004, but as of the time I write, no decision has been issued.
181
For the only facts we know about Padilla’s case, see Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Special
Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 2 (Aug. 27, 2002),
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush82702mobbs.pdf.

May 2004]

STATES OF EXCEPTION

45

whether, or for what purposes, his offer was taken up.182 Upon his return to
the United States, Padilla was arrested at O’Hare Airport in Chicago, and
flown to New York City to appear as a material witness before the grand
jury convened there.183 But before he could testify, he was taken into military custody and removed from New York. His lawyer first learned about
Padilla’s disappearance when she went to meet with him and found that he
was no longer held in New York.
Donna Newman, Padilla’s court-appointed lawyer under the material
witness warrant, started a long fight in which she attempted to figure out
where her client had been taken. Once she determined that Padilla had
been sent to a military brig and declared an enemy combatant by President
Bush, she began a legal battle to have his case reviewed by the federal
courts on a habeas petition. The DOJ, however, took the position that
Padilla was not entitled to see his lawyer, that he could be held indefinitely
as an enemy combatant in a military jail without charges or without any
means of communication with the outside world, and that he was in general
beyond the reach of the ordinary legal system. The DOJ argued that habeas
review was simply not available to those whom the President had deemed
enemy combatants.184
Since Padilla was not captured on the battlefield, his case has received
different treatment in the courts from that of Hamdi. Padilla’s case was
heard in the federal District Court for the Southern District of New York
because his original detention was in New York, so the direct conflict with
the rulings from the Eastern District of Virginia were also muted. Judge
Michael Mukasey held that Padilla was entitled to challenge his detention
on a habeas petition but, unlike Hamdi, Padilla was also entitled to meet
with his lawyer and prepare a defense.185 Unfortunately for Padilla, however, the judge also ruled that the government could hold him upon the
showing of only “some evidence” that he was an enemy combatant.186
“Some evidence” is a far cry from the level of proof that would normally
be required for long-term detention if this case were treated within the
normal criminal justice system. Furthermore, it has been unclear how
Padilla could successfully show that the government had failed to meet this
low standard. Even with this government-friendly ruling, the DOJ challenged Mukasey’s decision, refusing to allow Padilla’s lawyer access to
182

Here, too, the only evidence presented by the government to justify indefinite detention without
the right to counsel is yet another hearsay upon hearsay declaration by Michael Mobbs. See id.
183
Id. at 4.
184
For the government’s argument, see the Respondents’ Response to, and Motion to Dismiss, the
Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla v. Bush (S.D.N.Y.) (No. 02 Civ. 4445 (MBM)),
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush82702grsp.pdf, as well as the government’s
brief on the merits in the case before the Supreme Court, Brief for Petitioner, Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
(2004)
(No.
03-1027),
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/192/Padilla_BriefForThePetit
ioner.pdf.
185
Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
186
Id. at 608.
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him,187 and, having obtained certification from Judge Mukasey, the government launched an interlocutory appeal of Judge Mukasey’s decision to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Second Circuit made an even more forceful decision on Padilla’s
behalf.188 Ruling that Padilla had the right to consult with counsel (all three
judges on the panel agreed on this), the two-judge majority held that the
President had no authority to detain a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant
on American soil, absent explicit authorization of Congress.189 Aware of
the seriousness of the situation, the court reframed the legal question as one
about separation and sharing of powers,190 rather than about presidential
power, taken alone. The court took particular note of the Non-Detention
Act, which specifies that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress,”191 and
indicated that the President had no power, even under the Commander-inChief Clause of the Constitution, to detain an American citizen on American soil without the express authorization of Congress.192 The Joint Resolution passed by Congress in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 failed to provide such explicit authorization, the court held, ordering Padilla released
from military custody within thirty days.193 But Padilla has not yet been
released, pending a determination by the Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari in his case.194
The domestic enemy combatant cases have generated a great deal of
criticism, from human rights organizations195 to the American Bar Associa187

Padilla v. Bush was adhered to, on reconsideration, by Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), application granted, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), which found that because
the petitioner was not apprehended on the battlefield, counsel for petitioner had to be able to meet with
him to develop the facts of the case; otherwise the court could not assess whether the petitioner had
been detained arbitrarily.
188
See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
189
Id. at 720.
190
The opinion states:
As this Court sits only a short distance from where the World Trade Center once stood, we
are as keenly aware as anyone of the threat al Qaeda poses to our country and of the responsibilities the President and law enforcement officials bear for protecting the nation. But presidential authority does not exist in a vacuum, and this case involves not whether those responsibilities should be aggressively pursued, but whether the President is obligated, in the circumstances
presented here, to share them with Congress.
Id. at 699.
191
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
192
Padilla, 352 F.3d at 720.
193
The government filed a motion to stay the decision until the case could be heard by the Supreme
Court. See Affirmation in Support of Respondent’s Motion to Stay the Mandate, Padilla v. Rumsfeld,
352
F.3d
695
(2d
Cir.
2003)
(Nos.
03-2235(L.)
and
03-2438(Con.)),
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padrums11604staymot.pdf. Oral argument was held on
Wednesday, April 28, 2004, but as of the time I write, no decision has been issued.
194
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
195
See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty International, USA: One Year in Detention Without Charge
(June 9, 2003), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR510852003; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
WORLD REPORT 2002: UNITED STATES, at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/us.html (last visited May 3,
2004).
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tion.196 The cases have generated an unusual number of amicus briefs in
the Supreme Court.197 Even those who have otherwise taken the view that
the war on terrorism requires exceptional means have found that the enemy
combatant cases go too far. Instead of altering the usual rules of criminal
procedure, the enemy combatant cases infringe on more fundamental structural principles of American constitutional government, like the separation
of powers which requires independent judicial review of executive action,
especially as it pertains to the treatment of individual citizens and the basic
right of personal liberty.
Since 9/11 there has been a steady erosion of normality in the government’s response to terrorism. While one may have expected the sharpest
violations of the state of normality to come right after the attacks in a kind
of emotional reaction to the shock of the event, the trajectory has actually
been quite different. Instead of declining over time, the number of efforts
to claim exception—to argue that unusual times call for unusual measures—has in fact increased over time as the shock of 9/11 fades.
Perhaps most pronounced is the Bush administration’s increasing effort
to avoid regular judicial procedures at all by trying to bring the war on terrorism entirely within the executive branch and minimizing the influence of
both Congress and the courts. While the earliest 9/11-related cases were in
fact brought in the federal courts under regular criminal procedure (United
States v. Moussaoui198 and United States v. Lindh199), the post-9/11
roundup cases have been handled on a different model. They were processed primarily through administrative law courts,200 rather than through
regular Article III courts, because they were assimilated, often pretextually,
into the system of immigration control rather than the system of crime control. As 2002 progressed, the Attorney General guidelines were promulgated, changing the ground rules for terrorism investigations quite radically.201 From all an outsider can see, the DOJ’s methods for handling

196

See AM. BAR ASSOC., TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS, REVISED REPORT
HOUSE
OF
DELEGATES
(2003),
THE
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aba/abarpt21003cmbtnts.pdf.
197
An archive of the amicus briefs in the Hamdi and Padilla cases can be found in collections maintained by the law firm Jenner & Block. See U.S. Supreme Court Brief Resource Center: Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, at http://www.jenner.com/hamdi (last visited May 3, 2004); U.S. Supreme Court Brief Resource Center: Rumsfeld v. Padilla, at http://www.jenner.com/padilla (last visited May 3, 2004).
198
282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003).
199
227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002).
200
Administrative law judges do not have the same formal guarantees of independence as their Article III counterparts. In general, also, administrative proceedings, like deportation hearings, have been
deemed by regular court decisions prior to 9/11 not to require the full constitutional criminal procedure
protections that would be mandated in a criminal trial. To take one particularly relevant example, since
the mid-1990s (as a result of the anti-terrorism laws passed after the Oklahoma City bombing), immigration hearings can use “secret evidence” that the defendant and his/her lawyer cannot see, but that is
only shown to the judge. This serious abridgment of the Confrontation Clause would clearly not be
tolerated in an ordinary criminal case.
201
See supra notes 144–155 and accompanying text.
TO
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terrorism investigations have gotten more extreme and more “exceptional”
the further we get from 9/11.
There is also a sign that terrorism investigations have been increasingly
using methods that no longer require regular Fourth Amendment judicial
warrants. Instead, the DOJ has indicated that it prefers to go to the FISC,202
which proceeds on the basis of evidence that never has to be revealed and
which has never in its twenty-five-year history refused to grant a warrant
when asked.203 In addition, despite being required to do so by the USA
PATRIOT Act,204 the DOJ has reported only grudgingly on its use of USA
PATRIOT Act provisions to the Congress.205 And the minimal information
given so far has not enabled the Congress to engage in reasonable oversight
of the terrorism investigations, as both Republican and Democratic members of Congress have noted.206
The avoidance of separation of powers constraints in the domestic war
on terrorism has reached its height with the claimed presidential power to
label suspect individuals as enemy combatants who are immune from legal
process altogether. The “enemy combatant” label has dispensed with the
need to provide substantial evidence to hold a suspect in custody, according
to the Bush administration—and this pertains not only to aliens, but also to
American citizens. But the ability of the president to designate “enemy
combatants” is given neither directly by the Constitution nor by statute. It
has been asserted on the basis of the constitutional commander-in-chief
power to conduct wars as the president sees fit. The arguments in these
cases have so far revealed that the President is willing to provide little more
than general assertions about the alleged enemy’s activities. And the executive branch has denied that the courts even have jurisdiction to hear
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By now, Title III warrants account for only 25% of the total warrants obtained at the federal level.
FISA warrants constitute 75% of electronic surveillance orders. Compare FISA Statistics, supra note
85, with ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2001 WIRETAP REPORT 15-17 tbl. 2 (2002),
http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap01/table201.pdf.
203
For the FISC review statistics, see FISA Statistics, supra note 85.
204
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1001, 115 Stat. 272, 391 (instructing the Inspector General to prepare reports on civil liberties abuses).
205
The fourth such report was issued by the Inspector General (“IG”) of the DOJ on January 27,
2004. But the report provides few specifics compared with the more in-depth report done on the 9/11
detainees. In particular, the IG seems to have ruled almost all complaints out of his jurisdiction because
they do not involve actions by DOJ employees. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DOJ,
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1001 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT,
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0401a/final.pdf. But in a world where at least some of the most important information in the war on terrorism is collected privately, see, e.g., supra note 167, it may well
be that information that would come into government hands in violation of the civil liberties of citizens
and residents of the United States would not involve DOJ employees.
206
As one contemporary news story noted:
Many lawmakers said Ashcroft continues to be guarded or unresponsive when presented
with questions from Congress about the department’s use of the broad new surveillance and investigative powers given to them by the post-Sept. 11, 2001, USA Patriot Act, despite recent reports that have raised questions about the treatment of immigrant detainees, the increased use of
wiretap surveillance, and the use of Patriot Act provisions for non-terrorist crimes.
Emily Pierce, Ashcroft Rapped Over Oversight, ROLL CALL, June 9, 2003, at 1.
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these cases.207 The government has neither to bring charges, nor to present
evidence in a public forum, nor to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
the detained person has done what the government believes the detainee
has done. The “enemy combatant” label is the logical endpoint of a process in which the rule of law has been progressively undermined by assertions of executive power to determine when the rules no longer apply.
Though the courts have so far shown some substantial nervousness about
the breadth of the President’s claims in the enemy combatant cases and the
Second Circuit has held that the President flatly does not have this power,
the Bush administration has persisted in insisting that it alone can safeguard
the nation by determining unilaterally how to fight the “war” on terrorism.
B. The State of Exception in Foreign Policy
Having sketched the contours of the U.S. government’s post-9/11 domestic policy on terrorism, it should not be surprising to find roughly the
same general outlines in U.S. foreign policy.208 At first, the deviations
from rule-of-law-based practice were minor, but the invocations of the state
of exception, justifying a release from the rules, have increased as 9/11 recedes into the distance.
The most visible foreign policy response of the U.S. government right
after 9/11 was to look for a military target against which to retaliate. But al
Qaeda was not a country, and military doctrine typically operates with
countries as targets. The language that had been inserted into the congressional joint resolution authorizing the President to take all “necessary and
appropriate force” against those who attacked the United States also included language that extended the authorized use of force to those who
“harbored” the attackers.209 The “harboring” language gave the Bush administration domestic permission to launch its military attack against Afghanistan, where the Taliban government had given explicit protection to
the al Qaeda forces still there. Furthermore, Afghanistan had clearly served
as the physical headquarters of al Qaeda until just before the attacks.
Much of world opinion was on the side of the United States as it prosecuted a war against the battered and impoverished country of Afghanistan.210 Many allies offered to fight alongside the United States.211 The in-
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Calling the President’s judgment in the matter of enemy combatants a “quintessentially military
judgment,” the government argued that the military was better able to handle these cases than Article III
courts. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 16, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No.
03-6696), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/hamdirums120303gopp.pdf.
208
I should note that I will only discuss those aspects of foreign policy that are visible to someone
who does not have a security clearance. There were no doubt other major changes—such as alterations
in the CIA’s rules of engagement or in clandestine collaboration among security services or even an
increase in extraordinary renditions, much of which would be outside the public eye.
209
S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S9413-01 (2001) (enacted).
210
See Robin Wright, Coalition of Exceptional Depth is Forming, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at A3
(describing the wide support among nations for the war in Afghanistan). But see Ewen MacAskill et
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ternational press offered relatively little criticism, while occasionally wondering whether it was either humane or worthwhile to bomb a country
where little was left from previous wars.212 Understood as a reaction of
self-defense in response to a prior military attack, however, the U.S. war
against the Taliban government and their al Qaeda friends was widely
thought to be justified,213 even if the U.N. Security Council’s blessing had
not been explicitly sought as international law required.214 While the U.S.
military was nervous about invading a country that had never been successfully conquered, they were convinced in the end by the support from various allies who made the task easier. For example, the Russians gave permission to the United States to base its troops in former Soviet military
bases in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia. President Musharraf
of Pakistan (a country that had been subject to U.S. sanctions since May
1998 for having tested a nuclear weapon) was brought back into the proUnited States fold when he pledged his substantial support for the war
against Afghanistan.215 Since their own government had supported the
Taliban and had in fact been crucial in helping it come to power, the Paki-

al., Cracks Appear in Coalition, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 15, 2001, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/wtccrash/story/0,1300,552410,00.html.
211
On September 11, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (“NATO”) indicated that its eighteen
(at that time) members would provide “assistance and support” to the United States. Press Release,
NATO,
Statement
by
the
North
Atlantic
Council
(Sept.
11,
2001),
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-122e.htm. On September 12, NATO invoked Article 5 of its
charter for the first time in its history, declaring that a member state had been attacked from abroad and
that the mutual defense pact would therefore be activated. Press Release, NATO, Statement by the
North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm. This was
confirmed in detail with a further finding on October 12 that the attacks had been carried out by al
Qaeda, harbored by the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Update, NATO, Invocation of Article 5
Confirmed (Oct. 2, 2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm.
212
Soviet Invasion, TIMES (London), Oct. 5, 2001 (“If ever there was a place that could do without
another war, it is Afghanistan; on the other hand, Afghanistan is already so soaked in blood and bullets
that perhaps a just war, fought cleverly, for honest aims, might yet rescue it from its own history.”),
available at 2001 WL 4935167.
213
See, for example, the open letter signed by a number of prominent American intellectuals that
supported the attack. Statement, David Blankenhorn et al., Pre-emption, Iraq, and Just War: A Statement of Principles (Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.americanvalues.org/html/1b___pre-emption.html.
Richard Falk defended the limited use of force in Afghanistan in RICHARD FALK, THE GREAT TERROR
WAR (2003), but seems to have recanted. See Richard Falk, Letter to the Editor, NATION, Nov. 26,
2001, at 60.
214
The United States probably could have gotten Security Council backing for its attack on Afghanistan but it failed to do so and thus acted, strictly speaking, in violation of the U.N. Charter. See Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comments, The Use of Force Against Terrorism and International Law, 95
AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 836 (2001).
215
The United States had slapped sanctions on both India and Pakistan for their nuclear tests, and
sanctions against both came off together. See Stephen Collinson, Bush Administration Moves Towards
Lifting India-Pakistan Sanctions, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 22, 2001, 2001 WL 25018917. The
fact that President Musharraf seized power in a military coup had resulted in additional sanctions
against Pakistan. For the long history of military coups and the attempts of the Pakistani Supreme
Court to develop an informed and detailed jurisprudence of emergency, see Tayyab Mahmud, Praetorianism and Common Law in Post-Colonial Settings: Judicial Responses to Constitutional Breakdowns
in Pakistan, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1225.
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stanis were thought crucial to bringing the Taliban down. In any event, the
war in Afghanistan went far more quickly than pundits had predicted as the
Taliban government rather rapidly collapsed. Al Qaeda’s top leadership,
however, went underground and was not captured during the war.
No sooner had the main fighting in Afghanistan stopped, however,
when the United States started to claim a new state of exception against
well-understood rules of international law. This turned out to be more controversial than taking military action against Afghanistan without a Security Council resolution had been. Confronted with many detainees captured
on the battlefield by the various local militias that the United States had
pressed into assistance, the U.S. government made a decision to take direct
control of some of the captives for interrogation. The government, however, did this without giving the detainees the protection that international
law accorded them under the Geneva Conventions by providing access to a
“competent tribunal” to establish their status.216 Many of the detainees

216

The treatment of prisoners of war is generally covered in the Third Geneva Convention, and the
“competent tribunal” requirement is contained in Article 5. See Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
(entered into force Feb 2, 1956) [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. The legal advisor to the International Committee of the Red Cross, writing in a personal and not an institutional capacity, urged that
the treatment of at least some “unlawful combatants” is covered in the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of ‘Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants, INT’L REV. RED CROSS, at
45
(March
2003),
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5LPHBV/$File/irrc_849_Dorman.pdf. But the view
that there are no gaps in international humanitarian law and that all persons caught in a conflict situation
are protected in one way or another under the Geneva Conventions is commonplace. The Bush administration, asserting that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to “enemy combatants” (not a term in use
in international law) never attempted to fully justify its exceptions to the Geneva Conventions in legal
terms. In one press conference, (former) White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said that neither al
Qaeda nor the Taliban captives would automatically get Geneva Convention protections, noting that
such things depended on whether those captured fought by carrying weapons openly and whether they
wore uniforms. But then, under more persistent questioning, Fleischer seemed to admit that the detentions were made subject to no law in particular. A reporter, exasperated at not getting a straight answer
about whether the detainees were covered by the Geneva Convention or not, asked, “There's no international convention or there's no law on which we're detaining them, it's basically, they're dangerous, they
want to kill Americans, and we're going to keep them in detention.” And Fleischer seemed to grant the
point in his answer: “Keith, put it this way: There's a war in Afghanistan. These people did not stop
fighting; it was either be killed or be captured. These people were captured.” See Press Briefing by Press
Secretary, The White House (Jan. 9, 2002). This was, obviously, was far from the sort of compelling
legal analysis that one generally expects a government to undertake when it is going to make exception
to a widely agreed upon international convention. The White House eventually issued a fact sheet
summarizing the status of Guantánamo detainees under the Geneva Convention on February 7, 2002,
indicating that the Taliban detainees would in fact be accorded POW status. See Press Release, The
White House, Fact Sheet:
Status of Detainees at Guantánamo, (Feb. 7, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, In
Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A1 (reporting that the
shift in position had been strongly urged by European allies and had been advocated by Secretary of
State Colin Powell). The international objections to U.S. conduct in the matter of the detainees are not
to the possibility that a particular detainee would eventually be found guilty of war crimes (though as
we will see, the specific form of the military tribunals has caused an international outcry). The objections are instead that the United States never held individualized review of particular cases to determine
whether those detained were combatants (and if so, for which party) or civilians.
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were taken to a hastily constructed camp located in the American military
base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, halfway around the world.
Why Guantánamo Bay? It appears that this location was chosen because Guantánamo had been previously determined by a number of American courts to be an area that was explicitly not U.S. sovereign territory even
though the United States had effective and sole control there.217 The absence of U.S. sovereignty meant that American federal courts were quite
likely to claim they were largely powerless for jurisdictional reasons to review what occurred there.
Bird v. United States218 was a pre-9/11 case outside the terrorism context, but it gives the most complete historical account of the special situation at Guantánamo and its juridical implications. The base had been
leased from Cuba in 1903 in order “to enable the United States to maintain
the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for
its own defense.”219 The treaty was renewed in 1934 and while “the current
government in Cuba may not recognize these treaties, the 1903 agreement
does remain in effect.”220 The treaty was still valid because it explicitly
specifies that it can be terminated only by mutual agreement or by unilateral abandonment by the United States, neither of which had happened.221
In response to the argument that the United States had effective sovereignty
over the territory even though the legal sovereign may have officially been
another state, Judge Arterton noted that the 1903 treaty explicitly specified
that Cuba has ultimate sovereignty over Guantánamo and this was what
was crucial.222 Guantánamo, then, was deemed foreign territory and as a
result federal courts had no jurisdiction over what the U.S. government did
there.223 Successive executive branch opinions had held the same.224

217

E.g., Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995). In that case, Cuban
refugees sought admission to the United States once they got to Guantánamo and were denied access to
U.S. courts with the statement, “we . . . reject the argument that our leased military bases abroad which
continue under the sovereignty of foreign nations, hostile or friendly, are ‘functional[ly] equivalent’ to
being land borders or ports of entry of the United States or otherwise within the United States.” Id. at
1425 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
218
923 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1996).
219
Id. at 340 (quoting Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16–23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba,
T.S. 418).
220
Id. at 341 (footnote omitted).
221
The U.S. government sends annual rent checks of $4,085 to the Cuban government which has not
cashed these checks since the year after Fidel Castro came to power. Id. at 341 n.6 (referencing Jim
Wolf, U.S. Pays Cuba $4,085 Yearly for Leased Guantánamo Base, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 25,
1994, 1994 WL 6673251).
222
Id. at 342 (“[T]he leased land is subject to the ultimate sovereignty of Cuba.”).
223
See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1342 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Interestingly,
both United States citizens and aliens alike, charged with the commission of crimes on Guantánamo
Bay, are prosecuted under United States laws.”), cert. granted and vacated as moot sub nom. Sale v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 918 (1993) (mem.). This case found that certain Haitian detainees
could be “screened in” to the United States from Guantánamo to pursue their claims for refugee status,
but the reasoning relied on their refugee status, not on a general claim about the sovereign status of
Guantánamo.
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Given this strong authority, then, the Bush administration located Taliban and al Qaeda detainees at Guantánamo, a place that they could reasonably have expected would not trigger the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. In
an early challenge that arose within American domestic courts to the detentions, Rasul v. Bush, Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that Guantánamo was, indeed, not part of the sovereign territory of the United States.225 In fact, the
proposition had been so well established that plaintiffs did not even seek to
question Guantánamo’s ultimate status.226 Instead, plaintiffs claimed that
the United States exercised de facto sovereignty at Guantánamo, and that
this was sufficient for the application both of the Foreign Tort Claims Act
(on which a group of Kuwaiti detainees were basing their claim) as well as
for grounds to request a habeas writ (which two British detainees were
seeking).227 Judge Kollar-Kotelly dismissed both claims, rejecting the de
facto sovereignty test urged by the plaintiffs, citing the Bird case.228
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.229 Family members who had been permitted to proceed as the next friends of the detainees230 challenged Guantánamo’s status more directly, but the court held that

224
See 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 536, 537 (1929) (analyzing Guantánamo’s status in the context of a review
of other military bases); 6 Op Off. Legal Counsel 236, 238 (1982) (finding that the station at
Guantánamo is not a “possession” of the United States). See the more detailed discussion of the status
of Guantánamo in Gerald L. Neuman, Surveying Law and Borders: Anomalous Zones, 48 Stan. L. Rev.
1197, 1228-1234 (1996).
225
215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 72 (D.D.C. 2002).
226
See id. at 69 (“It is undisputed, even by the parties, that Guantánamo Bay is not part of the sovereign territory of the United States.”).
227
Id.
228
Id. at 71 (arguing that Guantánamo was outside the sovereign territory of the United States and
those detained were aliens). That meant, according to Judge Kollar-Kotelly, that the relevant precedent
on the habeas claim was Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). In Eisentrager, the Supreme
Court denied habeas to German nationals first captured and convicted of war crimes by an American
military tribunal convened in China and then imprisoned in Germany under U.S. military occupation, at
the end of World War II. Id. at 790. Even though the United States had functional military control in
Germany, such functional control did not give U.S. courts jurisdiction in the Eisentrager case. Judge
Kollar-Kotelly argued that it was the same at Guantánamo. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (“Eisentrager
is applicable to the aliens . . . at Guantánamo Bay.”). There were, as a result, no grounds on which to
extend a writ of habeas corpus. Aliens detained abroad and held abroad could not access American
courts simply because their captors were the U.S. military. The Foreign Tort Claims Act claim was
rejected as being a habeas petition in disguise. Id. at 62.
229
Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part, 124 S. Ct. 534
(2003) (mem.). Al Odah affirmed the district court judgment in Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C.
2002). The Supreme Court consolidated Al Odah and Rasul and granted certiorari limited to the question: “Whether United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.” Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (mem.); Al Odah v. United
States, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (mem.).
230
The Guantánamo detainees have been held without being able to consult with counsel or meet
with family members. Some of the detainees are allowed to exchange letters with family members, but
such letters (and the ones back from family members) pass through military screening. In the U.S.court cases consolidated in the Al Odah ruling, family members were bringing the habeas petitions as
next friends because the detainees were not able to approach the court themselves. The court permitted
the family members to be designated as next friends. Id. at 1138.
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determinations of sovereignty were “for the legislative and executive departments” to make and no such determination had been made here.231 As
a result, Guantánamo was not U.S. sovereign territory because no law made
it so.232 Instead, the court emphasized the similarity between the
Guantánamo detainees and the petitioning prisoners in Johnson v. Eisentrager.233 In Eisentrager, petitioners were Germans captured in China after
the German surrender at the end of the Second World War and accused of
continuing to spy on Americans despite the end of hostilities. The Germans were detained, tried by military commission, sentenced to prison, and
taken to Germany to serve their sentences in that occupied country, from
which they brought a habeas action in U.S. court. The Supreme Court held,
according to the Al Odah court, that no habeas writ could issue because the
prisoners were beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, even
though the prison where they were held was entirely within the functional
control of American authorities at the time.234 Eisentrager so closed the
door on habeas petitions from Guantánamo in the court’s view that it noted,
“[w]e cannot see why, or how, the writ [of habeas corpus] may be made
available to aliens abroad when basic constitutional protections are not.
This much is at the heart of Eisentrager.”235
The detainees petitioned the Supreme Court to hear their case, a petition
which the Court agreed to hear.236 The petitioners and the government include in their briefs sharply different readings of Eisentrager. Petitioners
assert that Eisentrager is a wholly different case from the present one, involving prisoners of war from an enemy state who had in fact been convicted of violating the laws in a military tribunal authorized by Congress.
By contrast, petitioners claim, the Guantánamo detainees are from friendly
states (Britain and Kuwait) and they have been neither charged nor convicted in any legal process. While the Eisentrager petitioners asked to be
released, the Guantánamo detainees want only to have their status determined by an independent tribunal.237 The government asserts that Eisentrager is on all fours with the present case: aliens captured abroad and held
abroad with no substantial connection to the United States do not have the
writ available to them.238 As I write, no opinion has yet been forthcoming.

231

Id. at 1143 (quoting Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380 (1948)).
Id. at 1143–44.
233
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
234
Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1139.
235
Id. at 1141.
236
See supra note 229 (explaining the Supreme Court’s consolidation of both detainees’ petitions).
Oral argument was held on April 20, 2004, but as I write, the opinion had not yet been issued.
237
See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, Rasul v. Bush (2003) (No. 03-334), available at
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/77/petitioners_brief_on_meri
ts2.pdf; Brief for Petitioners, Al Odah v. United States (2003) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), available at
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/78/Brief_For_Petitioners.pdf.
238
Brief for the Respondents, Al Odah v. United States (2003) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), available at
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/170/respondent_brief.pdf.
232
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Thus far, there has been no possibility for anyone to assert on behalf of
these prisoners that they were wrongly detained because the Geneva Conventions have no enforcement mechanism, save for the reciprocal selfinterest of those engaged in hostilities and the power that the armies and the
domestic courts of the hostile parties choose to give the treaties. While the
U.S. military generally accords the Geneva Conventions substantial weight
in its own internal regulations,239 the Supreme Court in Eisentrager explicitly held that the Geneva Conventions gave rise to no private rights of action in U.S. courts. The effectiveness of the Geneva Conventions generally
relies on the calculation that if one side treats the other side’s POWs well,
then their POWs will be treated well in return. The Geneva Conventions,
according to the Eisentrager court, place “responsibility for observance and
enforcement of these rights . . . upon political and military authorities.”240
As it turned out, it was impossible to challenge the U.S. detentions in
foreign courts as well. In The Queen on the Application of Abbasi v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,241 family members of
some British nationals being held at Guantánamo attempted to get the British courts to order the foreign secretary to intervene on their behalf to have
the detainees’ status clarified, consistent with the Third Geneva Convention. The solicitors for Feroz Ali Abbasi, one of the detainees, and his
mother had attempted to approach the U.S. government directly through the
American Embassy in London but had received word that Abbasi and others detained at Guantánamo were “enemy combatants” and would be held
for the duration of the war without legal process. They sued to get the British government to intervene.
The Court of Appeal ultimately ruled against Abbasi on the grounds
that the court had no authority to order the foreign secretary to act in any
particular way with respect to a matter within the scope of the British government’s foreign policy. But the judgment is particularly interesting for
the harsh terms in which it treats American claims that the detainees have
no legal status cognizable by any court. Calling the Guantánamo detention
a “legal black hole,” the court made much of the fact that the United States
had failed to comply with the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war because it had not allowed those who were detained to have a hearing on their
status. Instead, the United States had asserted that the detainees were, by
the definition of the conflict in which they had been captured, necessarily
“enemy combatants” not subject to prisoner-of-war protections.

239

The amicus brief filed by the National Institute for Military Justice in the Guantánamo cases before the Supreme Court discusses the regulations of the American military and the way in which those
regulations incorporate the Geneva Convention requirements for treatment of prisoners of war. Brief of
Amicus Curiae National Institute of Military Justice, Rasul v. Bush (2003) (Nos. 03-334 and 03-343),
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/92/amicuscuriae_national_in
stitute_of_military_justice.pdf.
240
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950).
241
[2002] All E.R. (D) 70 (Nov.) (Eng. C.A.), 2002 WL 31452052.
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With its tone fairly dripping with disdain for the American position, the
Court of Appeal noted that the status of “enemy combatant,” on which the
Bush administration relied, was not a conception recognizable in international law. Instead, the term appeared only in Ex Parte Quirin,242 an
American case approving the trial before a military commission of foreign
nationals who had entered U.S. territory to commit sabotage. As the Court
of Appeal pointed out, however, even on the Quirin standard, it was impossible to determine whether the status of enemy combatant in fact applied to
Abbasi because the circumstances of his capture had never been reviewed
by any court. While expressing hope that American courts might find jurisdiction to review the Guantánamo cases, the Court of Appeal nonetheless
found that British courts could do nothing within their own jurisdiction to
compel the British government to intervene in the matter.
The Abbasi case is notable because it reflects a view expressed by a
number of the United States’ allies abroad: not only that the Geneva Conventions should be followed in the war on terrorism, but also that all detainees should be able to have the bases for their detention reviewed by an
independent court to assess whether in fact the detention is warranted. The
protection that habeas review is supposed to offer those in U.S. detention
has been generalized as a principle of international law, both in the Geneva
Conventions and generally in other human rights bodies, such as the InterAmerican Commission, which condemned the U.S. position on
Guantánamo,243 and the European Court of Human Rights which, while
having no jurisdiction over Guantánamo, has a substantial jurisprudence
under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ensuring
access to court review of all detentions.244 Thus, when the Bush administration put the Guantánamo detainees into a position where their detentions could not be reviewed, they created an exceptional state that has been
roundly condemned.245
The condemnation has only increased as the Bush administration has
made public its plans to constitute specialized tribunals exclusively to try
the post-9/11 captives who have been held in Guantánamo. These military
tribunals were announced in a military order by President Bush shortly af-

242

317 U.S. 1 (1942)
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights took “precautionary measures” against the
United States in its session of March 12, 2002. Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba), 41 I.L.M. 532 (Inter-Am. C.H.R. 2002); see also Response of the
United States to Request for Precautionary Measures—Detainees in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 41 I.L.M.
1015 (Inter-Am. C.H.R. 2002).
244
The European Court of Human Rights has a lot of experience in this area, largely in reviewing
British legal strategy in Northern Ireland during the “troubles,” specifying rule-of-law guarantees even
for those suspected of terrorism. See Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14
(1988) (holding that even terrorism suspects could not be held without review and without charges for
as long as four days).
245
For example, two British law lords have explicitly condemned the detentions. Robert Verkaik,
Another Law Lord Criticises Detentions at Guantánamo Bay, INDEP. (London), Jan. 28, 2004, at 2,
2004 WL 67162485.
243
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ter the 9/11 attacks.246 At the start, the order indicated that such proceedings were to be limited to non-citizens and that they were to be run by the
U.S. military with procedural rules that were not the equal of those in normal American courts or in ordinary courts martial, for that matter. As the
rules have been elaborated,247 they have been simultaneously better and
worse than the critics feared. They are better because they require a judgment of guilt only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, they start
with the presumption of innocence and require unanimous verdicts before a
death penalty can be imposed.248
Nonetheless, the tribunals have been at least as bad as critics feared because all aspects of the procedure are controlled by the secretary of defense
or the secretary’s designee, the appointing authority (“AA”).249 The AA
approves all charges to be brought and supervises the procedure (including
security clearances) for qualifying any private defense counsel that the defendant may hire at his own cost. All judges on the tribunal and all staff
members—including the prosecutor—are appointed by the AA. The defendant is assigned (by the AA) to a military counsel, who is the only one
on the defense team allowed to see all of the evidence against the defendant. Evidence does not have to be offered orally250 and the defendant has
no right to confront witnesses against him.251 Instead, indirect (hearsay)
evidence may be admitted252 and the defendant himself may not be allowed
to learn all the evidence against him if it is national-security sensitive.253
While the defendant has some right to call witnesses, such rights are lim246

See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
247
The more specific framework was provided by DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION
ORDER NO. 1 (2002), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mco1.pdf [hereinafter DOD
ORDER]. Later, in a series of eight Military Commission Instructions dated April 30, 2003, the DOD
published detailed rules of procedure.
All of these documents can be found at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html, along with a ninth Military Commission Instruction dated December 26, 2003.
248
The general international acceptance that the death penalty is an inhumane punishment also hurts
the tribunals in international public opinion. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights
requires the forty-six signatory states to forswear use of the death penalty. For more on the European
attitude toward punishment generally, see JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 200–03 (2003).
249
The AA’s powers are given in the DOD Order. DOD ORDER, supra note 247.
250
The procedures specify that witnesses may appear in person, “by telephone, by audiovisual
means, or other means,” id. § 6(D)(2)(a), a list which does not exclude evidence given in writing. In
fact, the rules explicitly note that evidence given by unsworn or sworn written statements is admissible.
Id. § 6(D)(3).
251
Id. § 6(D)(2)(c). The rules indicate that witnesses who appear before the commission would be
subject to direct and cross-examination but are silent about what opportunities for challenging testimony would be given to those witnesses who are permitted by the earlier passage to testify through
means other than in-person appearance before the commission. Id.
252
Id. § 6(D)(1). The rules state that evidence is admissible if it “would have probative value to a
reasonable person,” a standard that does not exclude the introduction of hearsay. Id.
253
Id. § 6(D)(5) (providing for the protection of information that discloses sources or methods or
affects national security). Secret information may be deleted from documents available to both the defense and the defense’s personal lawyer. Id. § 6(D)(5)(b)(i). The AA-appointed defense lawyer may
still see this information. Id.
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ited to those witnesses whose presence will not disclose national-security
sensitive secrets and all witnesses called by the defense must be approved
by the presiding judge.254 At the end of the proceedings, the AA reviews
the transcript and signs off on the verdict before it is final, unless the president of the United States chooses to review the record for ultimate approval.255 There is no appeal to anyone outside the DOD, except the president of the United States, who was the one to designate which individuals
could be tried before the military tribunals in the first place.
Such procedures have not only elicited a great deal of domestic criticism,256 but they have generated perhaps even more protests from outside
the United States.257 Under the Third Geneva Convention, prisoners of war
may only be tried by a tribunal exhibiting “the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality,”258 which the proposed military tribunals fail to
do because they are under the direct control of the president and defense
secretary.259 When President Bush finally designated a few of the
Guantánamo detainees for possible trial before the military commissions,
the British Prime Minister Tony Blair immediately asked that the two British detainees in that first set not be subjected to this procedure.260 The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, learning that there was an Australian
citizen in that first military tribunals list, asked also for his national to be
exempted.261 The Bush administration promised to negotiate the procedures to be used in the case of nationals of U.S. allies, but it is unclear just
what such promises mean. In spring 2004, charges were brought against
254

Id. § 5(H) (“The Accused may obtain witnesses and documents for the Accused’s defense, to the
extent necessary and reasonably available as determined by the Presiding Officer.”).
255
Id. § 6(H) (providing for post-commission review of the proceedings by the AA and the secretary
of defense or, in some cases, the president). There is no other appeal allowed. Id.
256
See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, American Bar Ass’n, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2002) (condemning the Bush administration’s use of
military tribunals), http://www.abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf.
257
See, e.g., Sandro Contenta, Detained Britons Won’t Face Death Penalty For Now, TORONTO
STAR, July 20, 2003, at F3 (discussing the critical reaction in the United Kingdom to the tribunal procedures), 2003 WL 59323921.
258
Third Geneva Convention, art. 84, supra note 216, 6 U.S.T. at 3364–65.
259
For critical analyses of the military tribunal rules, see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (formerly LAWYERS
COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS), TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER: A GUIDE TO THE FINAL RULES FOR
MILITARY
COMMISSIONS
(2003),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/a_guide_to_the_final_rules.pdf, and HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
BRIEFING PAPER ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2003), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/militarycommissions.pdf.
260
Hamish MacDonell & Fraser Nelson, Blair the Showman’s Ultimate Performance, SCOTSMAN,
July 19, 2003, at 3, 2003 WL 63935338.
261
Australian national David Hicks has since been assigned a military defense lawyer though he has
not yet been charged. His lawyer has criticized the Guantánamo tribunals and has joined a brief to the
U.S. Supreme Court in the Al Odah case. Marian Wilkinson & Jonathan Pearlman, Military Trial Only
Option for Hicks, Says Ruddock, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 23, 2004, at 6, 2004 WL 55403140.
For the brief, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Military Attorneys Assigned to the Defense in the Office of
Military
Commissions,
Al
Odah
v.
United
States
(2003)
(No.
03-343),
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/91/AmicusCuriae_Military_
Attorneys.pdf.
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two Guantánamo detainees, one of whom is alleged to be a bodyguard and
driver for Osama bin Laden262 and the other an associate of bin Laden who
made a video glorifying the attack on the USS Cole.263
But however much international protest U.S. actions have caused to
date, nothing equals the international opposition mounted against the war in
Iraq—opposition which, as I write a year later, is still a fresh wound. Here
again, the United States essentially declared a state of exception from the
normal rules in play for the declaration of war, in which only the justification of imminent self-defense works to exempt a state from first going
through the U.N. Security Council procedures.264 While the United States
and its staunch ally Britain had started to go down the Security Council
road toward seeking a U.N. authorization of a military intervention with a
resolution on point, in the end the impossibility of getting such a resolution
meant that the United States and Britain had to go it nearly alone, without
such authorization. France, Germany, and Russia—two with Security
Council vetoes and the third on the council at the time—opposed the war;
mass populations all over Europe and in the Middle East opposed it too,
along with substantial numbers in the United States.265 Nonetheless, the
United States and the United Kingdom went forward, claiming that Saddam
Hussein had weapons of mass destruction that might fall into the hands of
terrorists, even though the proof they presented did not convince even the
countries that had recently authorized the weapons inspections.266
Much of the international community felt that either the U.N. procedures should be followed or that the war should not be launched. For the
U.N. to fail to support the war in a second resolution and for the war to be
launched anyway signaled to many that the United States had become lawless in international affairs.267 (Never mind that getting Security Council
resolutions before going to war had not been common practice since the
middle of the twentieth century, despite their endorsement by the U.N.

262

See
Charge:
Conspiracy,
United
States
v.
Al
Qosi,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/d20040224AlQosi.pdf.
263
See
Charge:
Conspiracy,
United
States
v.
Al
Bahlul,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/d20040224AlBahlul.pdf.
264
The U.N. Charter requires a state to bring its grievances to the Security Council instead of
launching a war on its own. A war is legitimate only if the U.N. agrees with the grievances and agrees
to sponsor an international military operation against the offender. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII. The only
exception to this is for immediate self-defense. Id. at ch. VII, art. 51.
265
On February 16, 2003, about five million people around the world demonstrated against the start
of the Iraq war. See Peter Conradi, Demos Follow Sun Around the Globe, SUNDAY TIMES (London),
Feb. 16, 2003, at 2 (describing anti-war protests in Iraq, New York City, and throughout Europe).
266
Judy Dempsey, Anti-War Axis: Three Capitals Stand Firm on Opposing Strike, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 15, 2003, at 2.
267
The Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State failed to produce a formal justification for the
war. For a review of the variety of opinions expressed on this subject by experts in the American Journal of International Law symposium on the legality of the Iraq war, see Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Editors’ Introduction: Agora: Future Implications of The Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J.
INT’L L. 553 (2003).
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Charter.)268 The arguments for the need to follow international law rang
out even in places that have not had a history of supporting international
law themselves.269
Moreover, the pressure that the United States put on its allies amounted
to trying to force them into a state of exception under their own laws. The
United States pressed hard on Turkey, which had a fragile new moderate
Islamist government, a history of military intervention in civilian government, and a historical stake in fighting Kurdish nationalism. When the civilian government refused to permit the United States to base its troops in
Turkey for an attack on Northern Iraq, the Turkish military made noise as if
it wanted to undermine the civilian government with a decision to the contrary.270 Furthermore, the United States did not discourage this, but pressed
as hard as possible for it (to the point of cutting off aid) right up until the
war started.271 With other allies—the Philippines and Germany, for example—whose constitutions forbid foreign military commitments, the United
States pressed hard to get them to support a military engagement that their
own governments would be constitutionally forbidden from entering into
on their own.272 Russia, which started out as a strong supporter of the U.S.
268

There is an interesting story to be told here about how the U.N. Security Council procedures
came to be normalized, despite having not been actually used very many times before this conflict. The
Security Council had been paralyzed during the Cold War because any military venture the United
States was likely to support would have been vetoed by the Soviet Union and vice versa. But even after
the end of the Cold War, the United States had bypassed the Security Council in the 1990s. For example, the United States considered support from NATO to be sufficient international cover for the operation in Kosovo, and there had been much more muted criticism on that occasion. Even though the Security Council procedure has been used very rarely in the way it seems to have been envisioned, by the
time of the Iraq war in spring 2003, nearly all the parties who spoke about the legitimacy of the war did
so as if it required such a resolution from the Security Council. As a result, the failure of the United
States and Britain to win support from the Security Council for a second resolution on Iraq was then
met with strong protests that military action without such a resolution was clearly illegitimate. Giving
some acknowledgment to this argument, the United States and Britain used the fact that there had been
a prior resolution, ordering Saddam Hussein to let in weapons inspectors and to cooperate with them or
face “consequences,” as a basis for justifying their eventual initiation of war. The resort to the first
resolution for legitimacy was an indirect affirmation of the position that the Security Council did need
to authorize a war that was not conducted for immediate self-defense. As a result, the Iraq war may
have established for the first time the widespread recognition that Security Council resolutions are in
fact needed for a state to legitimately go to war.
269
During the lead-up to the Iraq War, I was living in Moscow, where television reports and the
daily print media were full of arguments about the need to follow international law. Russia, like the
United States, had shown mostly disdain for international law during the Cold War.
270
Karl Vick, After Calls on Turkey, U.S. Put on Hold: Heeding Public Opposition, Ankara Delays
Decision on Use of Bases Against Iraq, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2003, at A14 (discussing concerns about
Turkish opinion regarding the war in Iraq).
271
See Andrew Buncombe, Iraq Crisis: U.S. Flexes Economic Muscle To Ensure Diplomatic Success, INDEP. (London), Feb. 25, 2003, at 2, 2003 WL 14682283. When Turkey backed out later, the
United States cut off all aid.
272
See, for example, Articles 25 and 26 of the German Constitution:
Article 25 (International law and Federal law)
The general rules of international law are an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.
Article 26 (Prohibition of preparations for a war of aggression)
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war on terrorism, looked at the United States’ Iraqi strategy in conjunction
with the other military efforts in the war on terrorism and thought that it too
might be an eventual target of U.S. aggression.273 This turned the Russian
population firmly, and the Russian government tepidly (at the very least),
against the war and against new American military campaigns, even though
they were done in the name of the war on terrorism.
Suffice it to say that many of the United States’ allies, no less than its
enemies, were pushed hard to violate both international agreements and
their own domestic constitutional provisions in order to be “with us” instead of “with the terrorists.” The price that allies paid for not supporting
the U.S. war on terrorism came either in financial terms (aid was cut to
Turkey and Russia and trade restrictions were threatened with France and
Germany) or in military terms (Russia believed itself to be surrounded and
Germany was threatened with a pull-out of American bases there). Those
who supported the United States, even at the cost of their own constitutional compliance, were generally rewarded for the use of the state of exception in their own countries. For example, in Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf
rammed through a package of constitutional amendments making himself
president, extending his term of office, and increasing the formal role of the
military in government without protest from the United States.274
(1) Acts tending to and undertaken with the intent of disturbing the peaceful relations between
nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, are unconstitutional. They shall be made
a punishable offense.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 25-26 (F.R.G.), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: GERMANY (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2003). The Federal Constitutional Court
ruled in a decision on July 12, 1994 that German troops could serve with peacekeeping forces authorized by the United Nations without violating this constitutional provision. Judgment of July 12, 1994,
90 BVerfGE 286 (F.R.G.).
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also references international law:
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
PHIL. CONST. art. II, § 2, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:
PHILIPPINES (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Supp. 1986).
273
This view was never stated directly by the Kremlin but it appeared with surprising frequency in
the Russian media. There is some evidence of the view, however: when Russia gave permission to the
United States to base its military in the Central Asian states and to use former Soviet military bases to
do so, the permission was conditioned on the promise that the troops’ presence would be temporary.
But now the United States is building permanent bases in these states. In addition, the United States has
dispatched special forces trainers to Georgia, on Russia’s border with Chechnya, and has been using
military air surveillance (some allegedly have broken into Russian airspace) to keep track of what is
going on in Chechnya. The United States is now talking about moving its European bases farther “forward” to get closer to the troublesome Middle East, but putting military bases in Romania, Bulgaria,
and Poland also brings the U.S. military closer to Russia. As a result, many Russians have gotten
prickly over what they see as an attempt by the United States to use the war on terrorism as an excuse to
surround its former adversary with military bases. See Seth Mydans, Free of Marx, But Now in the
Grip of a Dynasty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2003, at A4 (describing political transitions in Russia and the
“potentially explosive” issue of U.S. military presence).
274
See David Rohde, Musharraf Redraws Constitution, Blocking Promise of Democracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at A1 (discussing Musharraf’s political maneuvers after pledging support to the
United States); Karl Vick, Pakistani Leader Accused of Trying to Grab Power; Restructuring Plan Is
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In the foreign policy sphere, then, we can see the same sort of progression from the small exceptions to legality right after 9/11 to increasingly
large violations conducted with impunity that have become more blatant
and more common as 9/11 has receded. While the Bush administration
seems to have entered the war on terrorism after 9/11 with relative caution,
this quickly broke down as first the Geneva Conventions and then the U.N.
Convention itself were breached against strong opposition. The United
States has also been urging other countries to break their treaty obligations
as well as their own constitutions to enter the war on terrorism on the terms
set by the United States. Sometimes it even appears as though the Bush
administration would not mind bringing down the international system as a
by-product of its war on terrorism, since the international system acts as a
limitation to an endless state of exception.
III. POST-SCHMITT, POST-9/11
With this rather breathless tour of post-9/11 legal developments in
mind, what is to be said about the idea of the state of exception? As I noted
before, the state of exception according to Carl Schmitt is not just about
governance in unusual times; it is one of the defining characteristics of
sovereignty at all times and, as a result, it is the power whose exercise defines the very character of the sovereign.275 At a superficial level, the quality of President Bush’s presidency does seem to have been radically affected by the events of 9/11 and the need to respond to them. Political
commentary in the wake of 9/11 has frequently noted how the attacks gave
George W. Bush a rationale for his presidency, a missionary project that
has defined his entire term of office.276 Bush’s invocation of national security rationales has meant that he has not needed to otherwise justify or explain his course of action, except to say that, based on information that
cannot be widely shared, he understands that he must do what he proposes.
At this most obvious level, the use of exceptional powers to meet exceptional situations has in fact defined the specific quality of this administration.
But the state of exception in Schmitt’s terms goes deeper than this.
Schmitt is interested not only in the effects of using emergency powers on a
current head of state’s reputation or the mission a leader has when there is a
sudden need to meet a sudden threat. Schmitt is also interested in the character of regimes, of the possible limits to the rule of law (or the very idea of
normality) that must be acknowledged if a threat is to be met. For Schmitt,
it is the exception, not the state of normality, that defines what normal

Broadly Condemned, WASH. POST, June 28, 2002, at A18 (discussing Musharraf’s plan to replace Pakistan’s parliamentary system).
275
SCHMITT, supra note 27, at 12.
276
Patrick E. Tyler, A Reminder of a Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2003, at A1 (discussing the attacks as a defining moment of Bush’s presidency).
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means.277 The exception, then, has transformative powers over the very nature of the state. In this sense, I think, the Bush administration’s use of exceptional logics has failed because the world in which the Bush administration acts is not the early twentieth century world that Schmitt took as his
backdrop, a world of national and fragmented power. Even though the
Bush administration has been able to do virtually everything it has wanted
to in the war on terrorism, it has not succeeded in justifying what it has
done to an international public or, increasingly, to substantial segments of
the American public either.
Americans, beaten down in their constitutional expectations by the
permanent changes brought about during the Cold War, have become used
to the logic of the exception. The American presidency is supposed to take
the lead in responding to threats, and virtually all other constitutional
checks on his power are temporarily suspended—or work with a substantial
bias in favor of approving emergency-justified presidential action while it
is still deemed necessary. As I argued earlier, the American response to
World War II and its aftermath was immediately tied up with defending the
state against foreign threats that the Soviet Union posed and thus, the
United States has rarely gone through a substantial questioning of the limits
of emergency powers.278 Instead, the American constitutional order has
learned to live with them.
Nonetheless, a number of America’s European allies have taken a different trajectory since the defeat of Nazi Germany. Both in new constitutions that have been written and in the elaboration of international law,
states of emergency have been filled up with more legal content, rather than
with overt exceptions to legality.279 States of emergency, as a result, are
277

SCHMITT, supra note 27, at 13.
The 1970s debates around the findings of the Church Committee and the subsequent enactment of
a statute ending existing states of emergency and putting eventual expiration dates on new ones were
rare exceptions. See National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at
50 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000)).
279
The legal content is defined in a variety of different ways. While Germany’s new post-war constitution deliberately did not contain a provision for a state of emergency at all out of fear it would be
used, Article 16 of the French Constitution of 1958 gave emergency powers almost exclusively to the
president, in contrast with the shared-powers approach that had characterized the previous regime of
legally regulated états de siege. Even so, there are official roles for the National Assembly and the
Constitutional Council to play in the state of emergency:
When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity of its
territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are threatened in a grave and immediate manner and when the regular functioning of the constitutional governmental authorities is
interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the measures commanded by these circu
stances, after official consultation with the Premier, the Presidents of the assemblies and the
Constitutional Council.
He shall inform the nation of these measures in a message.
These measures must be prompted by the desire to ensure to the constitutional governmental authorities, in the shortest possible time, the means of fulfilling their assigned functions. The
Constitutional Council shall be consulted with regard to such measures.
Parliament shall meet by right.
The National Assembly may not be dissolved during the exercise of emergency powers by
the President.
278
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moments that call for an even stricter application of law than might usually
be the case, even as particular legal restrictions are loosened.280

FR. CONST. art. 16, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: FRANCE (Gisbert
H. Flanz ed., Supp. 1999).
280
The German constitution stands as a model for how a state of emergency may be legally regulated. When Germany eventually amended its constitution in 1968 to give definite legal shape to its
understanding of the “state of defense,” it added an extraordinary amount of detail to the precise procedures that had to be followed in this exceptional state. As a result, the German state of defense is at
least as much under the rule of law as normal governance is:
Article 80a (State of tension)
(1) Where this Basic Law or a federal law on defence, including the protection of the civilian
population, stipulates that legal provisions may only be applied in accordance with this Article, their application shall, except when a state of defence exists, be admissible only after
the Bundestag has determined that a state of tension (Spannungsfall) exists or if it has specifically approved such application. In respect of the cases mentioned in the first sentence
of paragraph (5) and the second sentence of paragraph (6) of Article 12a, such determination
of a state of tension and such specific approval shall require a two-thirds majority of the
votes cast.
(2) Any measures taken by virtue of legal provisions enacted under paragraph (1) of this Article
shall be revoked whenever the Bundestag so requests.
(3) In derogation of paragraph (1) of this Article, the application of such legal provisions shall
also be admissible by virtue of, and in accordance with, a decision taken with the consent of
the Federal Government by an international organ within the framework of a treaty of alliance. Any measures taken pursuant to this paragraph shall be revoked whenever the
Bundestag so requests with the majority of its members.
....
Article 115a (Determination of a state of defence)
(1) The determination that the federal territory is being attacked by armed force or that such an
attack is directly imminent (state of defence) shall be made by the Bundestag with the consent of the Bundesrat. Such determination shall be made at the request of the Federal Government and shall require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which shall include at least
the majority of the members of the Bundestag.
(2) If the situation imperatively calls for immediate action and if insurmountable obstacles prevent the timely meeting of the Bundestag, or if there is no quorum in the Bundestag, the
Joint Committee shall make this determination with a two-thirds majority of the votes cast,
which shall include at least the majority of its members.
(3) The determination shall be promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette by the Federal President
pursuant to Article 82. If this cannot be done in time, the promulgation shall be effected in
another manner; it shall subsequently be printed in the Federal Law Gazette as soon as circumstances permit.
(4) If the Federal territory is being attacked by armed force and if the competent organs of the
Federation are not in a position at once to make the determination provided for in the first
sentence of paragraph (1) of this Article, such determination shall be deemed to have been
made and promulgated at the time the attack began. The Federal President shall announce
such time as soon as circumstances permit.
(5) When the determination of the existence of a state of defence has been promulgated and if
the federal territory is being attacked by armed force, the Federal President may, with the
consent of the Bundestag, issue internationally valid declarations regarding the existence of
such state of defence subject to the conditions mentioned in paragraph (2) of this Article, the
Joint Committee shall thereupon deputize for the Bundestag.
Article 115b (Power of command during state of defence)
Upon the promulgation of a state of defence, the power of command over the Armed
Forces shall pass to the Federal Chancellor.
Article 115c (Legislative compliance of the Federation during state of defence)
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(1) The Federation shall have the right to exercise concurrent legislation even in matters belonging to the legislative competence of the Laender by enacting laws to be applicable upon the
occurrence of a state of defence. Such laws shall require the consent of the Bundesrat.
(2) Federal legislation to be applicable upon the occurrence of a state of defence to the extent
required by conditions obtaining while such state of defence exists, may make provision for:
1. preliminary compensation to be made in the event of expropriations, thus diverging from
the second sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 14;
2. deprivations of liberty for a period not exceeding four days, if no judge has been able to
act within the period applying in normal times, thus diverging from the third sentence of
paragraph (2) and the first sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 104.
(3) Federal legislation to be applicable upon the occurrence of a state of defence to the extent
required for averting an existing or directly imminent attack, may, subject to the consent of
the Bundesrat, regulate the administration and the fiscal system of the Federation and the
Laender in divergence from Sections VIII, VIIIa and X, provided that the viability of the
Laender, communes and associations of communes is safeguarded, particularly in fiscal
matters.
(4) Federal laws enacted pursuant to paragraph (1) or subparagraph (1) of paragraph (2) of this
Article may, for the purpose of preparing for their execution, be applied even prior to the
occurrence of a state of defence.
Article 115d (Shortened procedure in the case of urgent bills during state of defence)
(1) While a state of defence exists, the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article shall
apply in respect of federal legislation, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (2) of
Article 76, the second sentence of paragraph (1) and paragraphs (2) to (4) of Article 77, Article 78, and paragraph (1) of Article 82.
(2) Bills submitted as urgent by the Federal Government shall be forwarded to the Bundesrat at
the same time as they are submitted to the Bundestag. The Bundestag and the Bundesrat
shall debate such bills in common without delay. In so far as the consent of the Bundesrat is
necessary, the majority of its votes shall be required for any such bill to become a law. Details shall be regulated by rules of procedure adopted by the Bundestag and requiring the
consent of the Bundesrat.
(3) The second sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 115a shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect
of the promulgation of such laws.
Article 115e (Status and functions of the Joint Committee)
(1) If, while a state of defence exists, the Joint Committee determines with a two-thirds majority
of the votes cast, which shall include at least the majority of its members, that insurmountable obstacles prevent the timely meeting of the Bundestag, or that there is no quorum in the
Bundestag, the Joint Committee shall have the status of both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat and shall exercises their rights as one body.
(2) The Joint Committee may not enact any law to amend this Basic Law or to deprive it of effect or application either in whole or in part. The Joint Committee shall not be authorized to
enact laws pursuant to paragraph (1) of Article 24 or to Article 29.
Article 115f (Extraordinary powers of the Federation during state of defence)
(1) While a state of defence exists, the Federal Government may to the extent necessitated by
circumstances:
1. commit the Federal Border Guard throughout the federal territory;
2. issue instructions not only to federal administrative authorities but also to Land governments and, if it deems the matter urgent, to Land authorities, and may delegate this power
to members of Land governments to be designated by it.
(2) The Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the Joint Committee, shall be informed without delay of
the measures taken in accordance with paragraph (1) of this Article.
Article 115g (States and functions of the Federal Constitutional Court during state of defence)
The constitutional status and the exercise of the constitutional functions of the Federal
Constitutional Court and its judges must not be impaired. The Law on the Federal Constitutional Court may not be amended by a law enacted by the Joint Committee except insofar as
such amendment is required, also in the opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court, to maintain
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the capability of the Court to function. Pending the enactment of such a law, the Federal Constitutional Court may take such measures as are necessary to maintain the capability of the Court
to carry out its work. Any decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court in pursuance of the second and third sentence of this Article shall require a two-thirds majority of the judges present.
Article 115h (Legislative terms and terms of office during state of defence)
(1) Any legislative terms of the Bundestag or of Land diets due to expire while a state of defence exists shall end six months after the termination of such state of defence. A term of
office of the Federal President due to expire while a state of defence exists, and the exercise
of his functions by the President of the Bundesrat in case of the premature vacancy of the
Federal President’s office, shall end nine months after the termination of such state of defence. The term of office of a member of the Federal Constitutional Court due to expire
while a state of defence exists shall end six months after the termination of such state of defence.
(2) Should the necessity arise for the Joint Committee to elect a new Federal Chancellor, the
Committee shall do so with the majority of its members; the Federal President shall propose
a candidate to the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee can express its lack of confidence
in the Chancellor only by electing a successor with a two-thirds majority of its members.
(3) The Bundestag shall not be dissolved while a state of defence exists.
Article 115i (Extraordinary power of the Land governments)
(1) If the competent federal organs are incapable of taking the measures necessary to avert the
danger, and if the situation imperatively calls for immediate independent action in individual parts of the federal territory, the Land governments or the authorities or commissioners
designated by them shall be authorized to take, within their respective spheres of competence, the measures provided for in paragraph (1) of Article 115f.
(2) Any measures taken in accordance with paragraph (1) of the present Article may be revoked
at any time by the Federal Government, or in the case of Land authorities and subordinate
federal authorities, by Land Prime Ministers.
Article 115k (Grade and duration of validity of extraordinary laws and ordinances having the
force of law)
(1) Laws enacted in accordance with Articles 115c, 115e, and 115g, as well as ordinances having the force of law issued by virtue of such laws, shall, for the duration of their applicability, suspend legislation contrary to such laws or ordinances. This shall not apply to earlier
legislation enacted by virtue of Articles 115c, 115e or 115g.
(2) Laws adopted by the Joint Committee, and ordinances having the force of law issued by virtue of such laws, shall cease to have effect not later than six months after the termination of
a state of defence.
(3) Laws containing provisions that diverge from Articles 91a, 91b, 104a, 106 and 107, shall
apply no longer than the end of the second fiscal year following upon the termination of the
state of defence. After such termination they may, with the consent of the Bundesrat, be
amended by federal legislation so as to lead up to the settlement provided for in Sections
VIIIa and X.
Article 115l (Repealing of extraordinary laws, Termination of state of defence, Conclusion of
peace)
(1) The Bundestag, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may at any time repeal laws enacted by
the Joint Committee. The Bundesrat may request the Bundestag to make a decision in any
such matter. Any measures taken by the Joint Committee or the Federal Government to
avert a danger shall be revoked if the Bundestag and the Bundesrat so decide.
(2) The Bundestag, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may at any time declare the state of defence terminated by a decision to be promulgated by the Federal President. The Bundesrat
may request the Bundestag to make a decision in any such matter. The state of defence
must be declared terminated without delay when the prerequisites for the determination
thereof no longer exist.
(3) The conclusion of peace shall be the subject of a federal law.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] arts. 80a, 115a–115l (F.R.G.) (provisions cited were inserted by federal law in
1968), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
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To see why the Schmittian logic of exception has much less attraction
for American allies in much of Europe, it is necessary to briefly revisit the
historical period in which Schmitt claimed that a state of exception could
and should have this transformative effect on ordinary politics. When
Schmitt wrote, parliamentary government was teetering on the brink of
breakdown not only in Germany but in much of continental Europe, and the
democratic republic established by the Weimar Constitution was fraught
with internal inconsistencies, irreconcilable differences, and a growing
sense of crisis. The Weimar Constitution’s Article 48 seemed to Realpolitik theorists like Schmitt to be the constitutional way out of the mess.
Schmitt had advocated the strengthening of executive power against the
weakness of parliamentarism as the only strategy that would ensure the
maintenance of the republic. History knows what happened later: the rise
of fascism, the destruction of democratic government, war, the camps.
Schmitt was himself a convert to and justifier of the fascist cause; many
have seen in Schmitt’s idea of the exception the seeds—even the seedlings
and whole forests—of fascism.
But however powerful we believe ideas can be in the world, they only
can be played out on the world stage if there are other historical and material circumstances that allow them to be realized. And there were many
features of both Weimar Germany and inter-war Europe that allowed
Schmitt’s exceptional justifications to take hold at that time. I will not rehearse them all here—there has been plenty of scholarship on the point.281
But I will mention just a few of the elements. While constitutional monarchies were more stable in Europe at that time, republican governments established in inter-war Europe were generally fragile. The conception of
executive power in the new republics had generally not made a complete
practical or intellectual transition from the model of the monarchy to the
model of a democratically accountable head of state. The settlements at the
end of the First World War had left resentment in their wake among the
losers and leaders could whip up popular sentiment by promising a return

GERMANY (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1974). For a discussion of these provisions,
see C. C. Schweitzer, Emergency Powers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 22 W. POL. Q. 112
(1969).
281

By now, the literature on Schmitt, his historical moment, and the political and theoretical debates
surrounding him is enormous. Some of the most recent book-length contributions in English include
JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY, CARL SCHMITT: THEORIST FOR THE REICH (1983); RENATO CRISTI, CARL
SCHMITT AND AUTHORITARIAN LIBERALISM: STRONG STATE, FREE ECONOMY (1998); DAVID
DYZENHAUS, LAW AS POLITICS: CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM (1998); DAVID
DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN
WEIMAR (1997); HEINRICH MEIER, FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SCHMITT,
POLITICAL THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Marcus Brainard trans., 1998); CHANTAL
MOUFFE, THE CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT (1999); WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, CARL SCHMITT: THE
END OF LAW 181–251 (1999); GEORGE SCHWAB, THE CHALLENGE OF THE EXCEPTION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF CARL SCHMITT BETWEEN 1921 AND 1936 (2d ed. 1989).
Special issues of journals have been devoted to assessing Schmitt’s legacy—see, for example, 10
CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE (1997), and, the exposition dedicated to Schmitt that started the
modern debate in English, Special Issue on Carl Schmitt, 72 TELOS 3 (1987).
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to the pre-War status quo.282 The Russian Revolution created enormous
sympathies both toward communism and toward revolutionary change in
the rest of Europe, while also inspiring strong reaction against such revolutionary movements.283 Anxiety about national belonging was easily channeled into nationalism, and nationalism was at that time in Europe premised on the idea of a “people” whose boundaries of membership were
inflexible because they were tied to birth and ethnicity. Law, in consequence, was national law, and the devices and justifications for sovereignty
were national justifications.
Against this background, Schmitt’s idea of the state of exception can be
seen as a distinctly national and nationalist idea. He imagines a sovereign
of a nation, one who (as we learn in some of Schmitt’s other work)284 has
as a primary job defining who is inside the sphere of protection (the friend)
and who is outside (the enemy), locked in perpetual and mortal combat.
The idea of the exception is related to this fundamentally agonistic conception of politics; the exception is what allows the sovereign to strike out
against the enemy with the rationale that he is protecting the friend. But
this conception of politics presupposes that all that is relevant about sovereignty can be captured in a single person who is sovereign of a nation that
provides a first approximation of the universe of friends. The nation-state
is the only sort of entity from whose perspective such clear dividing lines
can be drawn. As democratic constitutional governments have replaced
monarchies, and as immigration has become common in states once defined primarily by ethnic affiliation, Schmitt’s idea of sovereignty no
longer reflects facts on the ground. Nationalism is no longer an ideology
that attracts sympathies outside the sphere of the nationalists themselves.285
The negative lessons of fascism, and also the negative lessons of Stalinism, were taken on board in the construction of new national governments
and new transnational institutions after World War II. The horror of the
camps, the unspeakable destruction of total wars, even the later shadow of
nuclear catastrophe—these living nightmares constituted the new forms of
destruction that appeared simultaneously with the abolition of empires and
monarchies, with the rise of both democratic and republican governments,
with the ever-widening victory of constitutionalism and with the increasing
appeals to the idea of universal human rights. Much of the first two-thirds
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See generally SALLY MARKS, THE ILLUSION OF PEACE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE
1918–1933 (2d. ed. 2003) (tracing the effects of the post-war agreements on European politics from the
signing of the peace treaties to the collapse of the Weimar Republic).
283
See generally DONALD F. BUSKY, COMMUNISM IN HISTORY AND THEORY: THE EUROPEAN
EXPERIENCE (2002) (documenting how the Russian Revolution made communism attractive as a theory
and present as a live political option in European politics for much of the 20th century).
284
CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (J. Harvey Lomax trans., Univ. of Chi. Press
1996) (1928).
285
See generally ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONALISM (1997) (providing a theoretical account of what
nationalism believes itself to be); ANTHONY SMITH, NATIONALISM: THEORY, IDEOLOGY AND HISTORY
(2001) (describing the rise of nationalism, its consolidation and its critics).
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of the twentieth century286 was dominated by the simultaneous development of two contradictory trends—the headlong rush to new forms of international destruction alongside the development of new forms of the protection of the individual as a political subject. The new human-rights
promoting democracies that emerged in Europe in the shadow of the world
wars are far from perfect, but they improved on the records of the governments that had been destroyed by World War II.
During the Cold War, Realpolitik foreign policy dominated international developments led by the United States and the Soviet Union. Serious
conflict in this period was typically recast as a proxy war among superpowers whose self-interest served as their primary motivations. But while
international relations were dominated by prospects of superpower conflict,
international law was growing in the shadows among powers that were less
“super.” Institutions that were to the superpowers merely symbolic debating clubs developed both institutional stability and defining sets of principles that struck out in directions different from the guiding ideas of the superpowers. The development of the U.N. system outside of the Security
Council, of international conventions and their non-coercive monitoring
frameworks, of regional human rights bodies and the increasing human
rights orientation of the successive waves of new constitutions that
emerged following the Second World War were all largely ignored by the
realist-driven superpowers. But develop they did. By the time the Cold
War ended rather surprisingly at the end of the 1980s, the Schmittian
framework of friend and enemy that had oriented world politics among the
superpowers for decades after the last total war simultaneously collapsed.
The result was the rise to real prominence of what had been thought by
the superpowers to be merely symbolic institutions. The U.N. and its system of international human rights protections assumed new powers and
new status precisely because the old order had vanished. The regional human rights bodies (backed up in the case of Europe with an ever-increasing
union) provided order that substituted for the old Cold War orientations.
Out from under the constant threat of nuclear catastrophe and the sense that
only sovereigns with “realist” views could manage the bipolar world, the
international institutions that had developed with the luxury of having the
sources of real power ignore them suddenly became sources of real power
themselves. International law, disparaged by realists throughout the Cold
War,287 suddenly became more law-like, at least in the sense that more
countries were willing to take its principles as binding on domestic decisions.

286

My argument here applies primarily to those countries that defined themselves as world powers;
obviously, in much of the less-powerful world, the concerns and trajectories were somewhat different.
287
The ultimate realist, Henry Kissinger, famously taught a course on international politics at Harvard. One class each term was devoted to international law. As legend would have it, each year Kissinger sent one of his research assistants to that class to announce that Professor Kissinger did not believe that there was such a thing as international law and that therefore the class was cancelled.
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But even in the absence of transnational bodies that could enforce principles of international law, new constitutions (particularly those written as
soviet communism and other repressive regimes collapsed) often include a
prominent place for international law in domestic constitutional law.288 International law is, then, increasingly viewed as a species of domestic law—
as binding legal norms that are integral parts of the domestic legal system
and that give fundamental provisions of the domestic legal system their
meaning. Part of this international law is the law of war, including the
U.N. Charter, the Geneva Conventions and, most recently, the jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court. While the United States may have
been oblivious (or opposed) to these developments since international law
is still not considered part of a basic legal education in the United States
and not widely respected either by U.S. courts289 or U.S. politicians,290
many other countries have been eagerly learning, adopting, and elaborating
this system.
As a result, regimes of law and regimes of war are no longer opposed
conceptions for many of the United States’ constitutional-democratic allies.
Instead, the increasing density of international norms in the period since
288

The Constitution of Hungary, for example, is typical in this regard:
Article 6
(1) The Republic of Hungary repudiates war as a means of dealing with conflicts between nations and refrains from the use of force against the independence or territorial integrity of
other states. It also refrains from making threats implying recourse to force.
(2) The Republic of Hungary is working for co-operation with all peoples and countries of the
world.
....
Article 7
(1) The legal system of the Republic of Hungary accepts the universally recognised of international law, and shall harmonises the internal laws and statutes of the country with the obligateons assumed under international law.
A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [Constitution] arts. 6–7 (Hung.), translated in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: HUNGARY (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1995).
289
This may be changing with the rather sudden appearance in the case law of the U.S. Supreme
Court at the end of the 2002–2003 term of nontrivial references to international law in two of the judgments. The most visible is the reference to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), where the majority opinion uses those decisions to show that
Western civilization has not had a uniform or unchanging view of homosexuality. Id. at 2481–83. The
other was the reference in the concurring opinion of Justice Ginsburg in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2325, 2347 (2003), where she indicates that the affirmative action principles upheld by the majority in
that case also are supported by two international agreements, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (which the United States has signed and ratified) and
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination against Women (which the United
States has signed but not ratified). For more along these lines by another distinguished commentator,
see Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 40 (1994) (noting that certain constitutional touchstones like the “evolving standard of decency” standard require reference to the practices of other countries).
290
Recently, several resolutions have been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives cautioning federal courts not to use foreign law. See, e.g., Constitutional Preservation Resolution, H.R. Res.
446, 108th Cong. (2003) (“Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Supreme
Court should base its decisions on the Constitution and the Laws of the United States, and not on the
law of any foreign country or any international law or agreement not made under the authority of the
United States.”).
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Schmitt wrote has produced a conception of war that is almost entirely
filled with legal content. Precisely in response to the horrors that Schmitt
saw coming (and perhaps assisted in producing), much of the international
community has pulled back from the brink of catastrophe and realized that
the very idea of war had to be governed by law.
Of course, creating a law of war no more ensures that wars follow the
law than creating a criminal code ensures that there is no crime in a society.
But the legal framework, if agreed upon widely, provides the basis for condemnation of individual country practices in the same way that a domestic
criminal code provides the basis for the condemnation of individual acts.
The United States has not been in the forefront of the development—or for
that matter the adherence to—these international norms. In fact, even before 9/11, the United States was already one of the primary outlaws in this
field.291 But virtually no other country, with the exception of truly brutal
dictatorships, denies the binding applicability of international law in the
way that the United States does.292
This is why the United States has received so much criticism for the
way that it has conducted its foreign policy after 9/11 when its small public
vestiges of support for international norms collapsed entirely. The Iraq
War and the Guantánamo camps, to take the two most egregious cases, violate the now-well-established principles of international law so thoroughly
that the US position in taking exception them succeeds not in deeply reconstituting international politics, but instead in branding the United States as
the attempted wrecker of the international system. With few exceptions,
other countries have failed to recognize the legitimacy of the positions that
the United States has taken.293
Even in its domestic policy, the Bush administration has drawn both international and domestic criticism. As we have seen, American domestic
291

The United States’ adherence to the death penalty is one of the leading causes of consternation
among its constitutional allies. In 2003, the United States placed third in the world in the number of
people it executed, behind China and Iran, and with Vietnam and Saudi Arabia in close pursuit. Slight
(U.K.),
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7,
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Fall
in
Capital
Punishment,
GUARDIAN
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1187137,00.html.
292
By saying this, I am of course not implying that the United States operates like a brutal dictatorship. Instead, I want to make the point that many constitutional democracies now embed principles of
international law in their own constitutional orders not just in symbolic ways, but as real backstops for
domestic abuses of power. Because the United States by and large ignores international human rights
law as a source of legal authority, more pressure is placed on the U.S. Constitution to be the one and
only line of defense against serious assaults on rights. If the Constitution fails, the United States as a
legal matter goes into free fall apart from the potential protections available through state constitutions.
When countries whose constitutions and international commitments bind them to international law fail
their own internal obligations, the international law system provides a second line of defense.
293
In another article, I attempt to show that most of the other constitutional democracies in the world
have responded to 9/11 by using their domestic court systems to prosecute terrorists, much as the
United States did before 9/11. As a result, there have been trials of al Qaeda members in Germany, Italy, France, Spain, and the U.K. Even Russia, which faces a terrorist threat (or civil war) from Chechen
rebels, has reaffirmed its commitment to the maintenance of constitutional criminal procedure even as it
has prosecuted a war against the province. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Other People’s PATRIOT Acts,
LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
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courts, while initially more constitutionally alert, have since become quite
deferential to the Bush administration’s rationales for the declarations of
exception to states of normal legality. At times of crisis, the system of
separation of powers and the system for protection of human rights seem to
collapse into the one constitutional clause that gives the commander in
chief his powers. This, as constitutional historians are quick to note, generally does happen during wartime in the United States.294
But this sort of general collapse of constitutionalism does not generally
happen during wartime anymore in many of the world’s most respected
constitutional regimes. New constitutions often explicitly draw from the
failure of the Weimar Constitution in hedging their own states of exception
with legal guarantees. As we have seen, Germany’s constitution builds in
substantial and detailed protections against abuse of emergency powers.295
Later constitutions in other countries recovering from “regimes of horror”296 in the 1990s were even stronger on this point. It has now become a
matter of standard constitutional drafting practice to constitutionally regulate states of emergency within the constitution, so that the state of emergency—like the idea of war itself—has become an idea filled with legality.
One of the strongest protections among recently drafted constitutions can
be found in the South African Constitution, which allows a state of emergency to exist, but protects basic human rights and requires constant parliamentary review of related executive decisions.297

294

Perhaps the most alarming of the defenders of the practice that the law is silent in war is Chief
Justice William Rehnquist. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN WARTIME (1998) (tracing the history of civil liberties during times of national emergency).
295
See supra note 280.
296
Scheppele, supra note 45.
297
The legal regulation of the state of emergency is so exemplary that it is worth quoting the South
African Constitution at length:
(1) A state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of Parliament, and only
when—
(a) the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; and
(b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order.
(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in
consequence of that declaration, may be effective only—
(a) prospectively; and
(b) for no more than 21 days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly
resolves to extend the declaration. The Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of
emergency for no more than three months at a time. The first extension of the state of
emergency must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of a majority of the
members of the Assembly. Any subsequent extension must be by a resolution adopted
with a supporting vote of at least 60 per cent of the members of the Assembly. A resolution in terms of this paragraph may be adopted only following a public debate in the Assembly.
(3) Any competent court may decide on the validity of—
(a) a declaration of a state of emergency;
(b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; or
(c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state
of emergency.
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(4) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the extent that—
(a) the derogation is strictly required by the emergency; and
(b) the legislation—
(i) is consistent with the Republic’s obligations under international law applicable to
states of emergency;
(ii) conforms to subsection (5); and
(iii) is published in the national Government Gazette as soon as reasonably possible after
being enacted.
(5) No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of emergency, and no legislation
enacted or other action taken in consequence of a declaration, may permit or authorise—
(a) indemnifying the state, or any person, in respect of any unlawful act;
(b) any derogation from this section; or
(c) any derogation from a section mentioned in column 1 of the Table of Non-Derogable
Rights, to the extent indicated opposite that section in column 3 of the Table. [This is
followed by a detailed list of which rights must be protected even in a state of emergency.]
…
(6) Whenever anyone is detained without trial in consequence of a derogation of rights resulting
from a declaration of a state of emergency, the following conditions must be observed:
(a) An adult family member or friend of the detainee must be contacted as soon as reasonably possible, and informed that the person has been detained.
(b) A notice must be published in the national Government Gazette within five days of the
person being detained, stating the detainee’s name and place of detention and referring
to the emergency measure in terms of which that person has been detained.
(c) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a
medical practitioner.
(d) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a legal
representative.
(e) A court must review the detention as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 10
days after the date the person was detained, and the court must release the detainee
unless it is necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and order.
(f) A detainee who is not released in terms of a review under paragraph (e), or who is not released in terms of a review under this paragraph, may apply to a court for a further review of the detention at any time after 10 days have passed since the previous review,
and the court must release the detainee unless it is still necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and order.
(g) The detainee must be allowed to appear in person before any court considering the detention, to be represented by a legal practitioner at those hearings, and to make representations against continued detention.
(h) The state must present written reasons to the court to justify the continued detention of
the detainee, and must give a copy of those reasons to the detainee at least two days before the court reviews the detention.
(7) If a court releases a detainee, that person may not be detained again on the same grounds
unless the state first shows a court good cause for re-detaining that person.
(8) Subsections (6) and (7) do not apply to persons who are not South African citizens and who
are detained in consequence of an international armed conflict. Instead, the state must comply with the standards binding on the Republic under international humanitarian law in respect of the detention of such persons.
S. AFR. CONST. § 37, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA (Gisbert H. Flanz ed. & Patricie H. Ward assoc. ed., 2004).
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Another more typical example is the 1993 Russian Constitution,298
which also requires both that a state of emergency be legally declared, and
also that a long list of rights be protected during the ongoing emergency.
These provisions have become typical of the new constitutions so that the
very idea of a state of emergency has become a constitutional idea and not
an extra-constitutional one. Rather than defining the edges of the sovereign
regime, as Schmitt argued, states of exception are now in practical terms
defined as states inside, not outside the constitutional framework. States of
emergency, like states of war, have been filled with legal content.
This is not to say that a Schmittian world view is impossible post-9/11.
The Bush administration has seemed to proceed from the presumption that
exceptional times demand exceptional means and that it is either naïve or
suicidal for a state to follow the rules in the current state of affairs. Perhaps
because other countries have experienced the horror of the collapse of the
rule of law firsthand in more extreme ways than has the United States in
the last century, much of the international community (and particularly
those democratic rule-of-law countries that count themselves among the
United States’ traditional allies) definitely rejected the Realpolitik presumptions underlying the Schmittian analysis of the state of exception.
The outrage and repulsion with which Schmitt’s views have been received in recent years299 provide some measure of the extent to which the
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and his proposed solutions to liberalism’s
weaknesses have been rejected. Schmitt’s anti-liberalism has either been
attributed to his fascist conversion, which is then taken as answer enough to
the intellectual challenges he may have posed, or it has been met with the
rule-of-law defenses of liberalism that, to Schmitt’s defenders, only serve

298

Article 56 of the Russian Constitution reads:
1. Under conditions of a state of emergency in order to ensure the safety of citizens and protection of the constitutional system, individual restriction of rights and freedoms with the identification of the extent and term of their duration may be instituted in conformity with the federal constitutional law.
2. A state of emergency throughout the territory of the Russian Federation and in specific areas
thereof may be introduced in circumstances and in conformity with the procedures defined by
the federal constitutional law.
3. The rights and freedoms specified in Articles 20, 21, 23 (part 1), 24, 28, 34 (part 1), 40 (part
1), 46–54 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation are not subject to restriction.
KONST. RF art. 56 (1993), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2002).
299
For an early example of the controversy, see the intense debate that erupted in the journalTelos
when Ellen Kennedy first attempted a discussion of Schmitt’s intellectual legacy in modern German
political theory. Ellen Kennedy, Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School, 71 TELOS 37 (1987) (arguing
that Schmitt is one of the intellectual sources of the Frankfurt School but showing that many of the
members of that school attempted to hide his influence after Schmitt’s association with fascism became
clear). The responses published in the same issue include: Martin Jay, Reconciling the Irreconcilable?
Rejoinder to Kennedy 71 TELOS 67 (1987); Alfons Söllner, Beyond Carl Schmitt: Political Theory in
the Frankfurt School, 71 TELOS 81(1987); Ulrich K. Preubeta, The Critique of German Liberalism: Reply to Kennedy, 71 Telos 97 (1987). Kennedy responded, Ellen Kennedy, Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School: A Rejoinder, 73 TELOS 101 (1987). .
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to reinforce the point that liberals are bad at dealing with political crises.
But over the last several decades, there is a growing condemnation of the
legitimacy of suspending the rule of law in order to defend a country—at
least not in “advanced” constitutional democracies.300 In fact, there has
been an expansion of the rule of law to cover more and more situations
previously judged to be practically and perhaps even morally extra-legal.
Instead of following the logic of the exception, the rule of law has become
coterminous in both the intellectual debate and in the public mind in most
constitutional democracies with the democratic political order itself. The
rule of law has become an article of faith and not a controversial or internally fraught idea that needs public philosophical attention.301
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have tried to explain why the logic of Schmitt’s analyses no longer work as a practical matter to justify states of exception, even
when it is clear to the international community that something fundamental
has changed in the world system since 9/11. The institutional elaboration
of a new international system that has occurred since Schmitt’s time make
his ideas seem all the more dangerous, and yet all the more dated. There
are simply fewer states in the world willing to tolerate either Schmitt’s
conception of politics or his conception of the defining qualities of sovereignty. Schmitt’s philosophy has, in short, been met with a different sociology. For his ideas to be either persuasive or effective, they must be more
than internally coherent or even plausible; they must be loosed in a context
in which they can win against other competing ideas. Precisely because of
the horrors of the twentieth century, much of the international community
that has entrenched both democracy and the rule of law has turned away
from these extra-legal justifications for states of exception. Instead, such
states have attempted to embed exceptionality as an instance of the normal,
and not as a repudiation of the possibility of normality. . Only the United
States, with its eighteenth-century constitution and Cold War legacy of exceptionalism, seems to be soldiering on in this new legal space of conflict
unaware that the defining aspect of the new sovereignty is that even the
new sovereign is bound by rules.
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For a discussion of the developing comparative constitutional jurisprudence on the rule of law,
see Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn’t Count: The 2000 Elections and the Failure of the
Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1370–85 (2001).
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This obviously does not apply quite as fully to political theorists and legal philosophers for whom
such debates are their main stock in trade. Such debates have probably had a more and more “academic” quality because it has been hard to imagine them breaking into the public discourse without serious misunderstanding.

